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In ubiquitous fashion, the best interest of the child is common to both child 
support and child custody determinations.  And yet formulations of what 
constitutes a child’s best interest is opaque, perennially infused with cultural 
permeations and societal aspirations.  In practice it is more pronouncement than 
application.  Past influences include stereotypes of gender hierarchy, who 
qualifies as a parent, the means by which parenthood may be established, and 
purported goals for projected parent-child interactions.  But the devil is in the 
details.  Amidst these influences is the concrete necessity of providing a child 
with financial support.  How much money is enough to provide a “minimum 
decent standard of living”1 and in a manner that residential and nonresidential 
parents are treated fairly.2  A child’s best interest is elusive but at a minimum it 
includes, “the child’s interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, 
and continuity and stability of its environment.”3 
The structure of a child’s best interest consists of both physical custody and 
child support.  One interacts with the other to provide a trial judge a basis for 
                                                 
 + Professor of Law Emeritus, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; 
Visiting Professor of Law, The Georgetown University Law Center.  The author is grateful to 
Emmett J. Whelan for his professional editorial assistance.  This Article is dedicated to James J. 
Tenn, Jr., Esq. in honor of his commitment to family law practice for more than 30 years. 
 1. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 3.04(1)(a) (AM. L. INST. 2002). 
 2. Id. § 3.04(3)–(4). 
 3. In re Shyina B., 752 A.2d 1139, 1143 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (quoting Schult v. Schult, 
699 A.2d 134, 139 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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determining the child’s overall well-being.4  State statutes permit a trial judge 
wide discretion in allotting custody between parents.  For example, in  practice, 
when a trial judge assigns one parent sole physical custody of the child, a 
residential parent, this parent is likely to receive greater amounts of child support 
due to that parent’s greater expenses associated with providing the child with a 
residential home, food, and recreation5.  The other parent, nonresidential, the 
one with liberal visitation rights but without significant custody time with the 
child, will be required to financially support the residential parent.  Common 
sense and mandated state statutory child support guidelines support this 
conclusion.  Likewise, if two parents share a relatively equal amount of child 
physical custody—both are residential because the child spends substantially 
equal time with each—logic would suggest that parental child support would 
balance itself out between the two, lessening or eliminating child support from 
either of the two parents.  Each parent would share the home, food, and 
recreation costs equally.  But even if the child has two residential parents one 
may have fewer economic resources than the other, hence the other parent may 
be ordered to pay child support to “ensure all parties the same standard of living 
if, before payment of child support, the parents had equal income.”6 
Increasingly legislatures, courts and a proportion of parents favor joint 
custody (residential) arrangements.  Such a development is proper to modern 
understanding of gender, assisted reproductive technology, and the fundamental 
right of parents to raise their child.  It is logical that joint custody arrangements, 
many evidenced in parenting plans inaugurated by the American Law Institute, 
would arise from a progression of previous custody arrangements.  This Article 
describes this development of custody.  But while custody is more often 
determined by parents with the assistance of arbitrators and mediation, child 
support is neglected.  Indeed, this Article argues that parents deserve the same 
type of services for child support determinations as is provided for child custody 
under the parenting plan structure of the American Law Institute.  Anything less, 
subverts the rights of both the parent and the child. 
Currently child support is part of divorce or separation litigation.  It is 
dominated by the expectation that statutory child support guidelines provide fair 
and equitable support obligations.  But the guidelines are inadequate, as will be 
described in this Article.  And their inadequacy is contrary to the federalization 
of child support, illustrated by a series of federal statutes, including the Family 
                                                 
 4. See generally Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662, 668–72 (Md. 1998) (discussing the best 
interest of the child standard applied to visitation). 
 5. See Rogers v. Rogers, 622 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. 2001). 
 6. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 3.05(2)(a); see also id. at § 3.06(1) (“The child-support formula should grant systematic relief to 
the support obligor whose income, after payment of child support at the full preliminary-assessment 
percentage, is insufficient to sustain a minimum decent standard of living.”). 
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Support Act of 1988.7  That Act mandated that states enact child support 
guidelines, anticipating that they would provide presumptive support amounts 
based on specific descriptive numeric criteria.8 
But as will be illustrated,9 the guidelines often do not adequately take into 
consideration the human factors involved, and often they are utilized without 
proper understanding of their limitations.10  Second, even though federal law 
mandates that the guidelines by reviewed at least every four years, the premises 
upon which they are based may become outdated as cultural permeations evolve.  
For example, some states have established trends toward a preference, even a 
presumption, of joint physical custody between non-cohabiting parents.11  No 
matter how joint physical custody may be defined, if such a preference or 
presumption is not accommodated in the guidelines, two consequences may 
result. 
Third, there may arise confusion in application of the specified amount by 
trial courts, resulting in an actual deficiency in providing for a child’s best 
interest.  This occurs, for example, when a state trial court orders a joint physical 
custody arrangement between two non-cohabiting parents and then reduces one 
parent’s child support obligation as a result, thinking that the two parents are 
sharing the burden of support equally.12  And yet, unless both parents share equal 
financial resources throughout the child’s minority, there needs to be a support 
payment to ensure that the child sustains a “minimum decent standard of 
living.”13 
And fourth, in the highly litigious arena of divorce, child custody, and child 
support, it is feasible that one parent may petition for joint physical custody 
                                                 
 7. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988); see Linda 
Henry Elrod, The Federalization of Child Support Guidelines, 6 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 103, 
111 (1990) (stating that the federal law was enacted because state child support orders varied 
drastically for no apparent reason). 
 8. § 103(a)(3), 102 Stat. at 2346; Rogers v. Rogers, 598 So. 2d 998, 1000 (Ala. Civ. App. 
1992) (“An award of child support resulting from the application of the guidelines is presumed 
correct.”). 
 9. See Serrano v. Serrano, No. 2018-CA-001888-ME, 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 178 
(Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2020); see discussion infra Section IV.A. 
 10. See, e.g., Griggs v. Griggs, 304 So. 741, 745–47 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020). 
 11. See, e.g., Erin Bajackson, Best Interests of the Child — A Legislative Journey Still in 
Motion, 25 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 311, 323 (2013); Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Golden 
Anniversary Issue, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The Interests of 
Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L. Q. 381, 393 (2008) (commenting that “the last forty years have 
seen various attempts to reign in judicial discretion with new presumptions, preferences, and lists 
of factors” to consider). 
 12. See, e.g., Sutchaleo v. Sutchaleo, 228 So. 3d 475, 479–80 (Ala. Civ. App. 2017) 
(illustrating that parent’s extended physical custody of the child was a sufficient reason to deviate 
from the child support guidelines as long as the trial judge recorded this reason). 
 13. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 3.0 (1)(a). 
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solely in order to achieve a reduction or elimination of child support.14  Indeed, 
there are those who posit that petitioning for joint physical custody is a strategy 
born of the fathers’ rights movement meant to lessen child support.15  The 
strategy may begin with parental separation and they initially agree to a 
temporary order of joint physical custody, based on joint allegations that this 
will work.  Then, as litigation ensues the temporary status becomes long-lasting 
and may eventually be incorporated into a final court decree.16  Once the trial 
court orders joint physical custody between the parents together with an ensuing 
request for equalization of child support, the order may be modified only with a 
petition alleging a material change of circumstances.17  This process is costly 
financially and personally.18  The new awareness of joint physical custody finds 
that often women may be more willing to settle for less alimony or child support 
to avoid even a small chance of losing custody of their children.19 
Often detrimental to a parent with fewer resources, child support orders 
remain in place while joint custody arrangements seldom last for very long.  
Either because of a child’s preference to be with one parent rather than the other, 
a growing disharmony between the two parents, or squabbles over newly arising 
issues such as new partners, finances, or recycled grievances, the child “drifts” 
into being physically with only one of the parents.20  Only the financial burden 
has increased, not the child support payment, which was reduced to 
                                                 
 14. See e.g., Lucero v. Lucero, 750 N.W.2d 377, 385 (Neb. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that 
Nebraska’s child support guidelines proved that when a court orders “visitation or parenting time 
periods of 28 days or more in any 90-day period, support payments may be reduced by up to 80 
percent, but that such determinations is made using the trial court’s discretion.”). 
 15.  See Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family 
Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79, 112 (2016) (“Growing legal coercion made child support 
obligations inescapable, activists focused on achieving legal reforms that would secure 
corresponding custody rights.”). 
 16. See Maritza Karmely, Presumption Law in Action: Why States Should Not Be Seduced 
Into Adopting A Joint Custody Presumption, 30 N.D. J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321, 339, 341 
(2016) (citing Nancy K. D. Lemon, Statutes Creating Rebuttable Presumptions Against Custody to 
Batterers: How Effective Are They?, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 601, 664 (2001)). 
 17. Lunney v. Lunney, 91 So. 3d 350, 355 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (stating that “there must be a 
material change in circumstances affecting the child’s best interest before there can be a significant 
modification of custody” (citing Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So. 2d 1193, 1194 (La. 1986)). 
 18. See In re Marriage of Minjares, 941 N.W.2d 604 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019) (holding that 
parents’ discord at divorce and continuing afterwards did not constitute substantial change of 
circumstances sufficient to modify custody). 
 19. See Margaret F. Brinig, Default Rules in Private and Public Law: Extending Default Rules 
Beyond Purely Economic Relationships: Penalty Defaults in Family Law: The Case of Child 
Custody, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 788–89 (2006). 
 20. See Karmely, supra note 16, at 348 (citing Mary Ann Mason, The Roller Coaster of Child 
Custody Law Over the Last Half Century, 24 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 451, 458 (2012)); see also 
Brinig, supra note 19, at 784 (reporting statistics of children drifting into patterns resembling sole 
physical custody with visitation); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.08(3) (supporting converting dual residence to single residence). 
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accommodate joint custody.21  Invariably the child suffers the loss of “important 
life opportunities.”22 
It is not surprising that psychologists agree that joint physical custody is more 
likely to result in a child’s positive outcome because it allows the child increased 
access to both parents.23  Nonetheless, when residential time with a parent is 
increased at the cost of a decrease in child support, a child will likely suffer, 
most assuredly when there is a disparity in income between the two parents.24  
“Economics affect children’s well-being through several mechanisms, including 
its effects on family stress, time with parents (e.g., when mothers must work 
more, they have less time with children), quality of parenting, and basic 
resources to meet material needs.”25  Child custody is inextricably connected 
with child support and while significant attention is focused on custody, the 
same cannot be said of child support.  The same level of parental participation 
that goes into a custody parenting plan must be expended on formulating a child 
support plan.  Parents need to be encouraged, assisted, and compelled to initiate 
support plans that are isolated from gender stereotypes, committed to personal 
practical possibilities, and not reliant on state modification or enforcement. 
First, this Article traces the evolution of parenthood to provide a sense of each 
parent’s constitutional importance.  A parent’s right—an expanded definition of 
who constitutes parents—to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and 
control of his or her child is now grounded in the Constitution’s Due Process 
Clause.26  In addition to biological parents, now there are expanding procedures 
to recognize parentage claims by adoptive parents, nonmarital partners, same-
sex partners, stepparents, estoppel parents, de-facto parents, and parentage 
occurring through assisted reproductive technology (ART).27  Among these 
ART possibilities are posthumous conception, surrogacy contracts, and intended 
parents occasioned by gamete donations.  The expansive nature of parental 
                                                 
 21. See Karmely, supra note 16, at 348–53. 
 22. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 3.04(2). 
 23. See, e.g., Karmely, supra note 16, at 363 (“[The] social policy argument [is] that the best 
interest of the child is served when both parents are involved in the child’s life.”); CHRISTY M. 
BUCHANAN, ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & SANFORD M. DORNBUSCH, ADOLESCENTS AFTER 
DIVORCE 66–67 (1996). 
 24. See Christy M. Buchanan & Parissa L. Jahromi, The Best Interests of the Child: Article & 
Empirical Study: A Psychological Perspective on Shared Custody Arrangements, 43 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 419, 432 (2008). 
 25. Id. at 420–21. 
 26. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 77 
(2000) (Souter, J., concurring); but see Raymond C. O’Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process 
Rights of Children Versus Parents, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1209, 1247–56 (1994).  The American Law 
Institute defines a legal parent, a parent by estoppel, and a de facto parent.  See PRINCIPLES OF THE 
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 cmts. a–c; Id. at § 
2.04(1). 
 27. See generally Raymond C. O’Brien, Marital Versus Nonmarital Entitlements, 45 ACTEC 
L. J. 79, 140–42 (2020). 
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claims, based on heightened awareness of the fundamental nature of parentage, 
supports greater scrutiny of custody and attendant support considerations.  The 
fundamental Due Process right guarantees equality of treatment irrespective of 
gender, race, physical handicap, or religious practices.28  As a consequence, 
legislation and judicial pronouncements emphasize joint decision-making, 
jointly drafted parenting plans, and custodial responsibility for modification and 
initiation.  Arguably the same should be apply to child support. 
Second, this Article explains the evolution of child custody arrangements and 
how this comports with an evolving understanding of parenthood.29  Each 
historical permeation was intended to satisfy the best interest of the child, a 
consistent standard throughout.  Today, both parents are often employed outside 
the home, both parents are presumptively required to support their children, and 
imputed income may be assigned without regard to gender.30  These features are 
required in state child support guidelines.31  As child custody arrangements 
evolved child support assessment did too.  Distinctively, modern child support 
requirements result from a series of federal requirements, prompting states to 
issue statutory guidelines, establish obligation, enforce payments, and punish 
those who fail to pay.  But the federalization of child support comes at a cost.  
The focus of state legislatures is on complying with federal mandates, often 
ignoring the practical elements of child support.  Among these elements are the 
increasing incidence of joint custody petitions, the retaliatory effect of domestic 
abuse allegations, the surrender of support to maximize custody, and the socially 
fluid nature of custody and support.   
Third, this Article discusses child support, why it originated and how it has 
become federalized.  The argument is made that state child support has become 
so besotted with federal compliance that states have neglected the local nature 
of child support, its connection with child custody, its fluidity, and its connection 
with the best interest of the child.  State-sanctioned mathematical child support 
guidelines often do not recognize the economic consequences of a child 
physically occupying two different homes for a comparable amount of time.32  
Guideline worksheets, forced to classify parents as “custodial parent” or 
“noncustodial parent,” “residential parent” or “nonresidential parent” do not 
actually accommodate joint physical custody with relatively equal parenting 
                                                 
 28. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.12(1) (Criteria for Parenting Plan—Prohibited Factors). 
 29. See Raymond C. O’Brien, Obergefell’s Impact on Functional Families, 66 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 363, 379–87 (2016). 
 30. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.15 (imputing income to the residential parent in computing child support 
awards). 
 31. O’Hara v. O’Hara, No. 2017-CA-001643-ME, 2018 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 925, at *5 
(Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2018) (“The child support guidelines require each party to pay their 
proportionate share of support without consideration of gender.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Serrano v. Serrano, No. 2018-CA-001888-ME, 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
178 (Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2020); see discussion infra Section III.A. 
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time.33  Furthermore, support guidelines are based on false assumptions, and 
their inability to adjust to fluid physical custody changes invariably render them 
inadequate or worse, unjust.  Having statutory guidelines are not sufficient, there 
must be more, there must be parental involvement in child support similar to 
what occurs with child custody awards. 
This Article concludes that mandated child support guidelines are a permanent 
fixture of child support.  But guidelines are the beginning of the child support 
assessment, not the end.  Guidelines must be reviewed at least every four years 
and review should be attentive to the changing nature of custody arrangements 
and incorporate more practical worksheets.  So too, parents need to be more 
involved in the review of the guidelines themselves, the manner and frequency 
of modification, and the integration of realistic support with realistic custody.  
To achieve this, courts should order that services be provided to parents so that 
they may establish support plans similar to parenting plans.34  The federalization 
of child support has lessened local and personal attention on the practical aspects 
of child support.  Rebutting the guidelines with individual circumstances is 
simply not enough.  The truth of the matter is that child support is just as 
important as child custody to the best interest of the child.  The two are 
interrelated and that is the point of this Article. 
I.  EVOLUTION OF PARENTHOOD 
In 2015, the Supreme Court held that neither the states nor the federal 
government could deprive same-sex couples of the fundamental right to marry.35  
Whatever anyone may think of the Court’s holding, the Court acknowledged that 
a nation’s understanding of what constitutes a fundamental right may evolve.36  
“[R]ights come not from ancient sources alone.  They rise, too, from a better 
informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives define a liberty that 
remains urgent in our own era.”37  Today—any day—when we posit the 
fundamental right of a parent to the care, custody and control of his or her child, 
this right arises from historical precedent and evolving social underpinnings. 
A.  Parentage as Fundamental 
The importance of child custody derives from the fundamental nature of 
parenthood itself.  When any person asserts a right to child custody, support, 
visitation, or even parentage itself, that person claims a status that is strictly 
                                                 
 33. Serrano, 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 178, at *17–19 (in part citing the lower court’s 
opinions). 
 34. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.07. 
 35. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015). 
 36. Id. at 669. 
 37. Id. at 671–72. 
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scrutinized and protected against all but compelling state purposes.38  There are 
innumerable references in judicial opinions upholding the fundamental right of 
a parent to raise his or her child.39  This fundamentality rests upon a platform, a 
history, of an evolving group of “preferred” rights.40  These “preferred rights” 
were identified as “particular forms of expression, action, or opportunity 
perceived as touching more deeply and permanently on human personality.” 41  
Among these are rights to travel,42 to vote,43 protection from racial 
classifications,44 and a liberty interest that includes a right to essential services,45 
intimate conduct,46 and marriage.47 
The fundamental liberty interest of parents to raise their children is one of the 
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Supreme Court.48  
State legislatures were gradual when codifying the presumptive ability of both 
parents to raise his or her child, with one specifying that “there shall be no prima-
facie right to the custody of the child in the father or mother.”49  But such modern 
envelopments are the result of cultural developments argued and purchased in 
recent decades.  The same may be said of same-sex parents, surrogate parents, 
de facto parents, and intentional parents.  All of these have enhanced the 
understanding of a parent’s fundamental right to the care, custody, and control 
of his or her child.  Parenthood is fundamental. 
                                                 
 38. Id. at 667. 
 39. See, e.g., id.  (“[Marriage] safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from 
related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 
(2000) (“fundamental right of parents to rear their children”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 
753 (1982) (“fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management 
of their child”); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 (1972) (“important interests of both parent 
and child”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (“traditional interest of parents with 
respect to the religious upbringing of their children”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) 
(discussing the right to “establish a home and bring up children”). 
 40. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). 
 41. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 770 (2d ed. 1988). 
 42. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969). 
 43. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966). 
 44. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484 (1982). 
 45. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 214, 230 (1982) (“The state may not make illegal 
immigrants a ‘subclass of illiterates’ by prohibiting them from attending school.”). 
 46. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“Liberty presumes an autonomy 
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression and certain intimate conduct.”). 
 47. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 681 (2015). 
 48. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
(1923)); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158, 165 (1944); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citations omitted); Wisconsin v. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Parham v. J.R., 
442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
 49. See GA. CODE. ANN. § 19-9-3 (2019). 
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B.  Gender Neutrality 
There was a time when the father of the child was thought to own his children, 
the value of their services, and the right to their custody in the father’s declining 
years.  Then a shift in the gender paradigm occurred, the custody rights of a 
father, most particularly a father not married to the child’s mother, were 
considered as minimal or nonexistent.50 The mother gradually was accorded 
presumptive rights.  First, by establishing a tender-years presumption that 
presumptively awarded physical custody of a child to the child’s mother if the 
child was of tender years.51  But as women entered the workforce more often 
and courts began applying equal protection scrutiny, there developed a shift 
towards both natural parents having the constitutional right to custody of their 
children.”52  Presumptively child custody was henceforth gender neutral. 
Gender neutrality is required by the American Law Institute’s Principles of 
Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations.53  The Principles 
lists factors that may not be considered when making a custody determination, 
such as a consideration of “the sex of a parent or of the child,”54 which is in 
accord with the goals of minimizing reliance on stereotypes, preserving diversity 
in parenting arrangements, and focusing on the Principles’ goal of planning for 
the child’s needs.55  Similarly, the 2017 revision of the Uniform Law 
Commission’s Uniform Parentage Act was proposed in part to provide gender 
neutral terms, specifically to ensure equal treatment of children born to same-
sex couples.56  The Act creates the mechanism by which parentage may be 
established and therefore it pertains to child custody determinations too.57 
                                                 
 50. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (holding that an unwed father is 
entitled to a parental fitness hearing under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause). 
 51. See, e.g., Gilliland v. Gilliland, 969 So. 2d 56, 66 (Miss. App. Ct. 2007) (defining the 
presumption as an assumption that, when a child is of such a tender age, custody should be awarded 
to the mother until child reaches an age when it can be equally cared for by the other parent); State 
ex. rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 290 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973) (holding tender-years 
presumption a violation of equal protection and stating that “[l]egislative classification may 
legitimately take account of need or ability; they may not be premised on unalterable sex 
characteristics that bear no necessary relationship to the individual’s need, ability or life 
situation.”). 
 52. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 661 (Burger, J., dissenting); see also Gender Fairness Implementation 
Comm’n, Gender Fairness in North Dakota’s Courts: A Ten-Year Assessment, 83 N.D. L. REV. 
309, 334 (2007) (finding there was no clear gender bias found but there was a perception of bias). 
 53. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW. OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.12(1)(b) 
 54. See id. 
 55. Id. § I2 II. 
 56. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note (UNIF.  L. COMM’N 2017).  “To the extent 
practicable, a provision of this [act] applicable to a father-child relationship applies to a mother-
child relationship and a provision of this [act] applicable to a mother-child relationship applies to a 
father-child relationship.”  Id. § 107. 
 57. See O’Brien, Obergefell’s Impact on Functional Families, supra note 29, at 379–81. 
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Despite advocacy for gender neutrality, the perception, and perhaps the 
reality, of gender discrimination persists.  The recent ascendency of joint 
physical child custody is due in part to “dissatisfaction with the legal treatment 
of divorced fathers who, supporters believed, seldom won custody under the 
ostensibly gender-neutral best-interests standard.”58  Among issues singled out 
as receiving disparate legal treatment are petitions by custodial mothers to 
change the name of the child, the mother’s relocation of the child, and the 
mother’s ability to restrict third-party access to the child, often the father’s 
parents.59 
Increasingly, fathers’ rights advocates protested that post-divorce restrictions 
on noncustodial fathers’ access to their children was gender discriminatory and 
diminished the parent-child relationship, hence was not in the best interest of the 
child.60  In addition, they argued, the nonresidential fathers were required to 
support this discrimination with a substantial financial child support obligation.  
Cost and denial of access to their children fostered resentment in many fathers.61  
And child support could no longer be taken lightly.  Federal mandates compelled 
states to be aggressive in enforcement through wage-withholding, passport 
refusals, and civil or criminal incarceration.62  Faced with what was perceived 
as discrimination and financial compulsion fathers organized to promote 
legislation that ensures greater access to child custody.63  Thus, “[i]n legislatures 
across the country, men’s groups have promoted joint-custody legislation, 
returning year after year in some states to lobby for favorable laws.  The efforts 
have been intensive—including testimony, letter-writing and email campaigns, 
media-advertising campaigns, blogging, and the placement of news stories, 
editorials, and op-eds.”64 
“Joint-custody campaigns have encountered stiff opposition in most states 
from coalitions of opponents including, most prominently, advocates for 
mothers.”65  Advocates for mothers “have effectively promoted statutory 
provisions categorically disfavoring the parent who has violently threatened 
either his child or the other parent.  In response, fathers’ groups have sought to 
weaken these laws while urging lawmakers (also successfully) to emphasize 
parental alienation as a key factor in the custody decision.”66 
                                                 
 58. Katharine T. Bartlett & Elizabeth S. Scott, Gender Politics and Child Custody: The 
Puzzling Persistence of the Best Interest Standard, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 77 (2014) 
[hereinafter Bartlett & Scott] (citations omitted). 
 59. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 60. Bartlett & Scott, supra, note 58 at 71–72. 
 61. Id. (citations omitted). 
 62. See Weinstein v. Albright, 261 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 63. Dinner, supra note 15, at 107–10. 
 64. Id.  One of the reasons for the rejection of the primary caretaker presumption of custody 
was that it seemingly preferred mothers over fathers.  Michael Abramowicz & Sarah Abramowicz, 
Bifurcating Settlements, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 376, 399 (2018). 
 65. Bartlett & Scott, supra note 58, at 78. 
 66. Id. at 83 (citations omitted). 
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Beneath the accusations is the gender stereotype of the father committing 
domestic violence against the mother, with the corresponding gender stereotype 
of the mother alienating the children from the father.  Besides being based in 
gender, both allegations “rest on private family information that might be 
difficult for a court to verify.”67  The American Law Institute provides for acute 
investigation of violence or abusive behavior through the appointment of a 
guardian ad litem, an attorney to represent the child, or a neutral person or 
agency.68  And, of course, any court should have the discretion to interview the 
child, or to appoint another to do so.69 
Interestingly, modern proposals suggested by the American Law Institute 
advocate that couples themselves address gender when formulating parenting 
plans with the help of mediators.70  Or, as an alternative to parenting plans, an 
allocation of custodial responsibility under an approximation schedule.71  
Professor Elizabeth S. Scott defines a custody sharing arrangement as an 
allocation of custody “proportionately between the parents on the basis of the 
caretaking roles they had while the family was intact.”72  As such, and consistent 
with the objectives of the American Law Institute, the “parents continue to share 
decision-making authority and each parents’ allocation of physical custody is 
determined on the basis of the family’s past practices.”73  Fathers, Professors 
Bartlett’s and Scott’s research suggests, perform about one-third of child care.74 
Gender is most often thought of in the context of mother and father, man, and 
woman, but assisted reproductive technology has widened the scope of gender.  
Two persons of the same sex can now become parents to a child and still share 
a genetic connection.  Likewise, a single person can intend to become a parent 
through a surrogacy contract, and genome editing now makes it possible for 
more than two persons to make a direct genetic contribution to a child that they 
can now assert is their own.  It seems that as we seek to make gender irrelevant, 
                                                 
 67. Id. at 89.  Parental alienation occurs when one parent disparages the other to the children 
in order to alienate the children from the other parent.  See, e.g., Schutz v. Schutz, 581 So. 2d 1290, 
1291, 1293 (Fla. 1991) (holding that mother was ordered to say good things about the father to 
reverse her parental alienation). 
 68. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.13; see also id. § 2.11 (protection of family member from violence); see 
also id. § 2.05(2)(f) (parenting plan requires description of violent circumstances); see also id. § 
2.05(3) (court must have a screening process to identify domestic violence); see also id. § 2.07(2) 
(requiring mediators to screen for domestic violence); see also id. at § 2.07(3) (precluding 
involuntary face-to-face mediation). 
 69. Id. § 2.14. 
 70. See id. § 2.05. 
 71. Id. § 2.08. 
 72. Bartlett & Scott, supra note 58, at 101. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. (citing Suzanne Bianchi, Maternal Employment and Time with Children: Dramatic 
Change or Surprising Continuity?, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 401, 411 (2000)). 
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it becomes increasingly relevant to fashioning parenthood and resulting child 
custody claims. 
C.  Assisted Reproductive Technology 
In 1978 a baby, Louise Joy Brown, was conceived and born as a result of 
assisted reproductive technology (ART), specifically in vitro fertilization 
(IVF).75  This was a revolutionary development at the time, but today an 
increasing percentage of the populations in the United States and throughout the 
world are using assisted reproduction in their pursuit of parenthood: “Perhaps as 
much as 12% of the white female population [in the United States] between the 
ages of 35 and 44, who also have at least a bachelor’s degree, have used [it].”76  
This is true even though the significant cost of ART is not covered by medical 
insurance.  Data collected from fertility clinics located throughout the United 
States illustrate the increased use of assisted reproduction: 
In 2013, the [National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and 
Health Promotion, Division of Reproductive Health] collected data 
from 467 fertility clinics then in operation and able to verify data 
submitted.  These clinics reported in 2013, that the number of ART 
cycles performed in the United States increased 25% from 2004 to 
2013, for a total of 190,773 ART cycles performed in 2013.  From 
these cycles ‘[t]he number of infants born who were conceived using 
ART increased from 59,458 in 2004 to 66,706 in 2013.’  The CDC 
reports that in 2013 approximately 1.5% of all infants born in the 
United States were conceived using some form of ART.77 
The rapid utilization of assisted reproduction is significant because “for the 
first time in history, it is now possible for a baby to have more than two genetic 
parents.”78  Traditionally persons could increase parentage options through state-
sanctioned statutory adoption, including most recently stepparent adoption.  
Today, through the use of ever-expanding medical technologies, a parent-child 
                                                 
 75. The term ART means any medical or scientific technology or method designed to assist 
one or more persons to cause a pregnancy through means other than by sexual intercourse.  See 
UNIF.  PARENTAGE ACT § 102(4) (including “intrauterine or intracervical insemination; . . . 
donation of gametes; . . . donation of embryos; . . . in vitro fertilization and transfer of embryos; 
and . . . intracytoplasmic sperm injection.”). 
 76. Hallie A. Hamilton, Note, Three-Parent Babies and FDA Jurisdiction: The Case for 
Regulating Three-Party In Vitro Fertilization as a Drug Biologic, 53 CREIGHTON L. REV. 427, 433 
n.46 (2020) (citing Gretchen Livingston, A Third of U.S. Adults Say They Have Used Fertility 
Treatments or Know Someone Who Has, PEW. RES. CTR. (July 17, 2018), https://www.pew-
research.org/fact-tank/2018/07/17/a-third-of-u-s-adults-say-they-have-used-fertility-treatments-
or-know-someone-who-has/). 
 77. Raymond C. O’Brien, Assessing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 27 CATH. U. J. OF L. 
& TECH. 1, 10–11 (2018) (citing to Ctr. for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013 Assisted 
Reproductive Technology: National Summary Report CDC 1, 3 (2015), 
ftp:://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/art/ART-2013-Clinic-Report-Full.pdf). 
 78. Id. at 49. 
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relationship may now occur through surrogacy, contract intentionality, estoppel, 
and coupled with the use of artificial insemination, posthumous conception, and 
mitochondrial transfer.79  Enlarging the scope of parentage prompts the issue: if 
a parent has a fundamental right to custody or visitation with a child, who 
constitutes a parent in this modern age? 
Symbolic of modern availability of parentage, in 2017 the Uniform Parentage 
Act was amended to accommodate same-sex couples, who are increasingly 
utilizing ART to become parents.80  State laws, like the Uniform Parentage Act, 
have had to catchup to societal changes.  For example, when a female same-sex 
married couple gave birth to a child through the use of artificial insemination 
and a donor sperm, they attempted to place both of their names on the child’s 
birth certificate as legal parents.81  But a state statute provided that the state did 
not have to issue a birth certificate to the female spouse of a woman who gave 
birth in the state.82  When the state statute was challenged, the Supreme Court 
of the United States held that the state statute was unconstitutional because it 
denied same-sex married couples equality of treatment with opposite-sex 
married couples.83  The decision is a recent illustration of the fundamental right 
of a parent that cannot be conditioned upon gender, including sexual orientation. 
There are two other ways that the parameters of parentage may be expanded.  
First, even though an individual has no genetic relationship with a child, if that 
“individual resided in the same household with the child for the first two years 
of the life of the child, including any period of temporary absence, and openly 
held out the child as the individual’s child[,]” then that individual is presumed 
to a parent of that child.84  The “intentionality” of the individual is the deciding 
factor in becoming, in the terms of the American Law Institute, a parent by 
estoppel or a de facto parent.85  And second, if an individual consents in writing, 
or by clear and convincing evidence, to assisted reproduction with the intent to 
                                                 
 79. See Raymond C. O’Brien, The Immediacy of Genome Editing and Mitochondrial 
Replacement, 9 WAKE FOREST J. OF L. & POL’Y, 419, 491 (2019).  A baby boy was born in Mexico 
City on April 6, 2016 after removing nuclear DNA from the target egg’s defective mtDNA and 
placing it within a donated egg with healthy mtDNA.  The nuclear DNA of the donated egg is 
similarly removed so that the healthy mtDNA is the only contribution made by the donor, but a 
genetic contribution, nonetheless.  Id. at 470. 
 80. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 107 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2017). 
 81. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 2078–79 (citing the holding in Obergefell v.  Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015)); see 
also Henderson v. Box, 947 F.3d 482, 487 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that “after Obergefell and 
Pavan, a state cannot presume that a husband is the father of a child born in wedlock, while denying 
an equivalent presumption to parents in same-sex marriages.”). 
 84. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2); see O’Brien, Obergefell’s Impact on Functional 
Families, supra note 29, at  400–02; see also PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 (establishing both a parent by estoppel at cmt. (b), and 
a de facto parent at cmt. (c)). 
 85. PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03. 
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be a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction, then that person is a 
parent of the child.86 
Surrogacy has been available for a long time, an early form of ART.  There 
are currently two options.  First, what is referenced as genetic surrogacy is 
mentioned in Hebrew Scripture.87  It is a practice whereby a woman agrees to 
become pregnant and carry the child to term using her own gamete (egg) and 
donor sperm.88  Modern genetic surrogacy does not require intercourse as was 
the case in the time of the Bible, it may be achieved through artificial 
insemination.89  The older practice involved a man seeking a child with a woman 
other than his wife, usually prompted by the wife’s inability to conceive a child.  
Compare genetic surrogacy with the second form of surrogacy, gestational 
surrogacy.  This is a modern development that involves a more advanced form 
of assisted reproduction.90  Most often gestational surrogacy involves both a 
donated egg and sperm, either from the parties themselves or purchased from an 
expanding list of fertility clinics.  Conception occurs outside the surrogate 
herself, the egg fertilized with the sperm in a medical laboratory.  Then, after 
conception, a fertilized egg—an embryo—is then placed in the surrogate who 
then carries the fetus to term, surrendering the infant to the intended parents after 
birth. 
Surrogacy may involve at a minimum five adult persons: the two donors, two 
parents, and one surrogate.  State statutes outline the parameters of any 
enforceable surrogacy agreement.  It must specify interests of all involved, 
including the spouse of the surrogate, spouses of donors, and spouses of the 
intended parents.91  In spite of the increasing use of national and international 
surrogacy, there continues to be hesitancy regarding surrogacy92 and court 
                                                 
 86. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 703–04; see, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 280, 282, 293 (1998) (holding that a man or woman consenting to an act that brings a child 
into being is a parent of that resulting child); see also In re Parentage of M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. 
2003) (finding that the Illinois Parentage Act does not bar common law theories of parentage in the 
absence of written consent). 
 87. See Genesis 16:1–16; see UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(1). 
 88. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(1). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. § 801(2). 
 91. See, e.g., id. § 804. 
 92. See, e.g., Rachel Wexler, Artificial Reproductive Technology and Gendered Notions of 
Parenthood After Obergefell: Analyzing the Legal Assumptions That Shaped the Baby M Case and 
the Hodge-Podge Nature of Current Surrogacy Law, 27 TUL. J. L. & SEXUALITY 1, 3–4 (2018) 
(discussing state statutes restricting or outlawing surrogacy); Tara R. Melillo, Gene Editing and the 
Rise of Designer Babies, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 757, 758 (2017) (discussing designer babies); 
See generally Deborah S. Mazer, Born Breach: The Challenge of Remedies in Surrogacy Contracts, 
28 YALE J.  L. & FEMINISM, 211, 215 (2016) (discussing surrogacy contract enforcement); Jessica 
M. Camano, International, Commercial, Gestational Surrogacy Through the Eyes of Children Born 
to Surrogates in Thailand: A Cry for Legal Attention, 96 B. U. L. REV. 571, 572 (2016) (discussing 
problems with international surrogacy). 
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decisions regarding validity of surrogacy contracts vary.93  Embedded in the 
judicial and legislative debate is the issue of who qualifies as a parent of the 
child of ART?  “Do all parents, whatever their numbers, acquire equal parental 
standing, with equal liability for child support and equal standing to seek custody 
and visitation?”94  This issue is still debated in the context of parental rights.  But 
there are those who argue that parentage during this age of ART must be viewed 
hierarchically, with primary parents, those making a substantial genetic 
contribution, receiving physical custody awards.95 
Hierarchical entitlement to custody seems particularly pertinent in the context 
of mitochondrial replacement, a newer and another form of ART.  The process 
includes a procedure during which embryos are modified and then “result in 
offspring with genetic material from three different persons, including two 
women of different maternal lineage.”96  As science develops, even more 
parental status claims may emerge.  Certainly, the development—and 
acceptance of—ART will affect the way that we view parental status, rights, and 
responsibilities.  As with the evolution of fundamental rights and gender 
neutrality, ART will influence policy and practice. 
II.  EVOLUTION OF CUSTODY ARRANGEMENTS 
A.  One Parent, Father or Mother 
As Lewis Carroll aptly advised: “Begin at the beginning . . . and go on till you 
come to the end: then stop.”97  Hence we must acknowledge that in the English 
courts of the Nineteenth Century, in the few cases of divorce and awarding 
custody of children that came before judges, the child’s father was entitled to 
custody unless he was found to have committed a grave act of immorality.98  But 
this rule did not emigrate from England to America.  Instead, courts in the United 
States applied a best interest standard and “awarded” custody of the child to one 
                                                 
 93. See, e.g., P.M. v. T.B., 907 N.W.2d 522, 533–34 (Iowa 2018) (holding that the surrogacy 
agreement did not violate public policy); Rosecky v. Schissel, 833 N.W.2d 634, 652–53 (Wis.  
2013) (holding that there was no state public policy objection to enforcing a genetic surrogacy 
agreement as long as it is in the best interests of the child).  For a survey of surrogacy laws, see 
Surrogacy Laws, THE SURROGACY EXPERIENCE, https://www.the surrogacyexperience.com/u-s-
surrogacy-law-by-state.html. 
 94. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Changing American State and Federal Childcare Laws: 
Parents, Babies, and More Parents, 92 CHI.-KENT L.  REV. 9, 10 (2017). 
 95. Id. at 46. 
 96. O’Brien, The Immediacy of Genome Editing and Mitochondrial Replacement, supra note 
79, at 471; G. Owen Schaefer & Markus K. Labude, Genetic Affinity and the Right to ‘Three-Parent 
IVF’, 34 J. ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETICS 1577, 1577 (2017). 
 97. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 110 (1865). 
 98. See, e.g., King v. De Manneville (1804) 102 Eng. Rep. 1054–55 (KB); Shelley v. 
Westbrooke, (1817) 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (Ch); see also LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND 
MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500–1800, 667–69 (1977). 
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or the other parent, most likely the mother.99  Courts at that time concluded that 
one parent, not both, would provide more permanency for the child and 
furthermore, since the father was more likely to work outside of the home, the 
mother was the logical choice for custody of the child.100  Recall that until 1979, 
many states had statutes that permitted alimony to be paid only from husbands 
to former wives.101  Because the former wife had the promise of financial support 
from her husband until her remarriage or death, coupled with domestic 
characteristics courts thought advantageous to children, the mother consistently 
received custody. 
Maternal preference for custody became known as the tender years 
presumption, which presumes that “in all cases where any child is of such tender 
age as to require the mother’s care for the child’s physical welfare, the child 
should be awarded to her custody, at least until the child reaches that age and 
maturity where the child can be equally well cared for by other persons.”102  By 
1925, the maternal tender years presumption was characteristic of custody 
awards throughout the United States but gradually, by the middle of the 
twentieth century, many women and mothers became more independent, both 
economically and socially.103  Many worked outside the family home, making 
women more on par with their husbands when it came to availability for child 
care.  By the time California became the first state to adopt no-fault divorce in 
1969, an increasing number of women were working outside the home.  Other 
states quickly adopted no-fault divorce and gradually there were parallel changes 
to laws affecting division of property, alimony, and child support 
distributions.104  “As late as 1970, 40% of American families met the model of 
                                                 
 99. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 100. See generally Dinner, supra note 15, at 81–82; Jay Einhorn, Child Custody in Historical 
Perspective: A Study of Changing Social Perceptions of Divorce and Child Custody in Anglo-
American Law, 4 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 119, 125 (1986); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the 
Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 481 (1984). 
 101. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279, 283 (1979) (holding that state statutes that permit 
alimony only from the husband to the wife violates Equal Protection). 
 102. Benal v. Benal, 22 So. 3d 369, 373 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the trial court did 
not err when awarding custody of child to the child’s mother). 
 103. See, e.g., Bozman v. Bozman, 830 A.2d 450, 496–97 (Md. 2003) (abolishing the marital 
tort exception); Warren v. State, 336 S.E.2d 221, 226 (Ga. 1985) (abolishing the marital rape 
exception); State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 232 (Mo. 1982) (permitting ex parte 
orders for domestic violence); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (women had a bodily privacy 
right to obtain an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (a single woman had the 
same right as a married woman to possession of contraceptives); Stuart v. Bd. of Supervisors of 
Elections, 295 A.2d 223, 227–28 (Md. 1972) (a woman had a right to retain her birth name). 
 104. See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Love and Obligation: Family Law and the Romance of 
Economics, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 990 (1995) (discussing division of property and child 
support); Jana B. Singer, Symposium on Divorce and Feminist Theory: Alimony and Efficiency: 
The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L. J. 2423, 
2423 (1994) (discussing validity of “economic justifications for alimony”). 
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one wage earner, a stay-at-home-wife, and two children; today less than one in 
four families do.”105 
In spite of the modern perception of equal economic self-sufficiency between 
both parents, when awarding child custody, mothers continued to 
disproportionately receive custody of their children.106  Consistently, statistics 
illustrate that children are most often awarded to the sole physical custody of 
their mothers.107  Women continue to have access to the workforce, yet they also 
are perceived as possessing advantageous skills in providing a child with 
emotional stability and security.108  And not only judges, but guardians ad litem 
(GAL), while protesting the use of the tender years presumption, nonetheless 
recommend that the mother be awarded custody because the GAL is simply “old 
fashioned.”109  Furthermore, statutory factors determining what is meant by the 
best interest of the child are often weighed in such a fashion that they favor 
activities normally performed by mothers.110  Hence, while the tender years 
presumption may explicitly be rejected by statute or by judicial decision,111 in 
practice mothers disproportionately are awarded sole physical custody of the 
child and fathers awarded liberal visitation. 
Sensing gender discrimination, male activist groups formed in the 1960s 
arguing that “social and legal construction of gender roles, far from 
subordinating women, oppressed men.”112  They pointed to “the fact that only 
three percent of fathers received physical custody of their children upon divorce 
[and this] established prima facie proof of sex discrimination.”113  The legal and 
cultural milieu of activism in the 1960s and 1970s provided a base for arguments 
of gender discrimination, equal protection, due process, and privacy.  State 
legislators were attentive, and this is reflected in an evolution of custody, 
summarized as follows: 
                                                 
 105. Elrod & Dale, supra note 11, at 386. 
 106. Julie E. Artis, Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Judges’ Accounts of the Tender 
Years Doctrine, 38 L. & SOC’Y REV. 769, 770–71 (2004). 
 107. See Elizabeth Gresk, Opposing Viewpoints: Best Interests of the Child vs. The Fathers’ 
Rights Movement, 33 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 390, 390 (2013). 
 108. See, e.g., Co v. Matson, 313 P.3d 521, 529 (Alaska 2013) (dismissing use of tender years 
and using factors under best interest of child standard). 
 109. See, e.g., In re Van Dorn, No. 5-18-0234, 2018 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2110, at *13–15 
(App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2018). 
 110. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Montgomery, 20 So. 3d 39, 44 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009); Lackey 
v. Fuller, 755 So. 2d 1083, 1089 (Miss. 2000) (“The [tender] age of the child is simply one of the 
factors we consider in determining the best interests of the child.”). 
 111. See State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 290 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973) (holding 
that the presumption runs afoul of Equal Protection guarantees); see also UNIF. MARRIAGE & 
DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9 U.L.A. 282 (1998) (codifying best interest of the child without reference to 
gender); but see Ramsay Laing Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CAL. L. REV. 335, 
335–37 (1982) (arguing that the doctrine better protects the best interest of the child). 
 112. Dinner, supra note 15, at 88. 
 113. Id. at 114 (citing Letter from Carlo E. Abbruzzese, Chairman, Family Law Action 
Council, to the President of the United States (n.d.) (on file with MFM Online, MEN Int’l)). 
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In the late 1970s, the prevailing doctrine was that the best interests of 
the child would be served by awarding sole custody to the parent who 
had served as the primary caretaker.  By the mid-1980s, nearly two-
thirds of states recognized that joint custody could sometimes be in the 
best interests of the child.  Between 1979 and 1982, twenty-one states 
passed joint custody statutes; these ranged in the strength of their 
preference from merely making joint custody an option available to 
the court to a presumption in favor of it.  By 1984, thirty-two states 
recognized joint custody in some form, and several more states 
followed suit in the late 1980s.  Many of these statutes went beyond 
legal recognition to create a presumption that joint custody served the 
best interests of the child.  A study by political scientist Herbert Jacob 
surveyed twenty-six states that passed joint custody statutes; fathers’ 
rights groups campaigned actively in fourteen of them.114 
The culture of the times, the rising influence of men’s activist groups, and the 
ascendency of strict enforcement of child support obligations contributed to 
increased petitions for joint physical custody.  “Fathers’ rights activists 
supported strong presumptions in favor of joint custody at the state level, 
coupled with minimal federal involvement in child support.”115  And at the same 
time, “women’s rights activists supported joint custody statutes only when 
parents agreed to this arrangement, and insisted on a powerful federal child 
support enforcement apparatus.”116  Many fathers and the groups that 
represented them thought of this system as unfair.  They viewed no-fault divorce 
as a means by which a father who had committed no marital fault, could 
nonetheless be deprived of his children because the mother petitioned for 
divorce and was then awarded sole physical custody of the couple’s children.  
And furthermore, fathers were then obligated to pay enforceable child support 
to the mother who now has sole physical custody of their children.117  And while 
it is arguable that fathers sought joint physical custody to lessen child support 
obligations, one commentator disputes this, writing that “[c]onsiderable 
evidence exists demonstrating that activists sincerely wanted divorced fathers to 
play greater caregiving roles in their children’s daily lives”118 through joint 
physical custody.  Or, at a minimum, states should enforce visitation orders with 
similar fervor to enforcement of child support. 
Reviewing custody arrangements, we can conclude that gender, and the 
stereotypes associated with each, was often determinative in assigning child 
custody.  But increasingly, financial resources obtained through employment or 
                                                 
 114. Id. at 121–22 (citations omitted). 
 115. Id. at 123. 
 116. Id.  Federal involvement in the collection of child support became more pronounced after 
passage of the Child Support Enforcement Amendments Act of 1984, which provided financial 
incentives to states to enforce collection of child support from parents.  Id. at 138. 
 117. Id. at 121. 
 118. Id. at 124–26. 
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through stricter enforcement of child support became determinative.  And 
throughout any custody dispute, the mother and the father were viewed as 
litigants by legislators and courts, the state trial courts serving as final arbiter on 
what is best for the child.  Eventually the focus will be on ways to avoid gender 
stereotypes, but the state trial court continues to be the arbiter between two 
litigants. 
B.  Primary Caretaker Presumption 
Seeking to avoid the gender inequality of the tender years presumption, but 
nonetheless hoping for an easier way—a presumptive way—to resolve custody 
disputes between two equal parents, a few states adopted what is known as the 
primary caretaker presumption.119  Chief Justice Neely of the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals formulated the parameters of who constitutes a 
child’s “primary caretaker” by identifying which parent has taken responsibility 
for: 
(1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and 
dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; (4) medical 
care, including nursing and trips to physicians; (5) arranging for social 
interaction among peers after school, i.e. transporting to friends’ 
houses or, for example, to girl or boy scout meetings; (6) arranging 
alternative care, i.e. babysitting, day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to bed 
at night, attending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in 
the morning; (8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners and toilet 
training; (9) educating, i.e. religious, cultural, social, etc.; and, (10) 
teaching elementary skills, i.e., reading, writing and arithmetic.120 
There were immediate concerns about using a presumption of primary 
caretaker for an award of custody.  Some argued that it conditioned primary 
status on only certain duties, not ones such as earning outside employment 
                                                 
 119. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360, 363 (W. Va. 1981) (holding that a court must 
give positive consideration to the parent who has been a primary caretaker for the child); see also 
High v. High, 697 S.E.2d 690, 700 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that there is an assumption that 
child custody will be awarded to primary caretaker); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(6) (2019) (“the 
history and nature of each parent’s participation in providing care for the child”). 
 120. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363.  Compare these functions with what is deemed necessary when 
any parent has custody of a child: 
Parenting functions are defined to include maintaining a safe, stable, consistent, and 
nurturing relationship with the child; attending to the child’s ongoing developmental 
needs, including feeding, clothing, grooming, emotional stability, and appropriate 
conflict resolution skills; attending to adequate education for the child; assisting the child 
in maintaining a safe, positive, and appropriate relationship with each parent and other 
family members; minimizing the child’s exposure to harmful parental conflict; assisting 
the child in developing skills to maintain safe, positive, and appropriate interpersonal 
relationships; and exercising support for social, academic, athletic, or other special 
interests. 
State v. Jeffrey T., 932 N.W.2d 692, 704 (Neb. 2019) (citing the NEB. PARENTING ACT § 43-
2922(17)).  
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wages so as to support the family.121  Others argued that primary caretaker roles 
do not adequately accommodate the changes in the modern family.  The point 
being that instead of caretaking, it would be better to use an approximation 
standard.  That is, to the extent possible, custody should be awarded in a manner 
that approximates the role of each parent in the child’s life.122  Some 
commentators are willing to provide the primary caretaker presumption with a 
slim preference when compared to everything else that is proposed.123  And yet 
consistent among all commentators is the suggestion that both parents work 
jointly to achieve a custody arrangement that, at least initially, avoids litigation.  
A summary of this suggestion is that: 
[W]hen a divorce is contemplated, parents should make a sincere 
effort to solve the problems of child custody themselves, thereby 
placing a high premium on family privacy and autonomy.  But when 
there are insoluble conflicts which the couple cannot solve privately 
or through mediation, the couple must go to court.  In such cases . . . a 
judge ought to approach child custody disputes from the vantage of 
the needs of the child based on the child’s particular age, attachments, 
and stage of development.  Additionally, the judge should consider the 
adult who can satisfy those needs best.124 
While the primary caretaker presumption gained few adherents, it did initiate 
a new emphasis on joint efforts by parents to formulate a child custody 
arrangement.  The new approach builds upon functions that the parents 
performed when living together, but now the emphasis is upon bringing each 
parent’s understanding of what works to the formulation of a mutually agreed 
upon custody plan.  Eventually this approach, incorporating function and joint 
parental involvement, will be adopted by the American Law Institute either 
through parenting plans,125 or if this is not possible, allocation of custodial 
responsibility between the two parents.126  Under the ALI, the parents are offered 
services to develop a parenting plan between themselves.127  But if they are 
unable to, then a court may “allocate custodial responsibility so that the 
proportion of custodial time the child spends with each parent approximates the 
                                                 
 121. See, e.g., Mary Kate Kearney, The New Paradigm in Custody Law: Looking at Parents 
with a Loving Eye, 28 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 543, 561–62 (1996). 
 122. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. 
REV. 615, 617 (1992). 
 123. See David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in 
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 568 (1984). 
 124. Sanford N. Katz, “That They May Thrive” Goal of Child Custody: Reflections on the 
Apparent Erosion of the Tender Years Presumption and the Emergence of the Primary Caretaker 
Presumption, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 123, 132 (1992) (citing to Joseph Goldstein et 
al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973)). 
 125. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.05. 
 126. See id. § 2.08. 
 127. Id. § 2.05 cmt. a–b.  See infra Section II.D. 
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proportion of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions for the 
child prior to the parents’ separation.”128 
Consistent with goals associated with the American Law Institute, an award 
of custody based on allocation of custodial responsibility seeks to continue the 
child’s relationship with both parents,129 but subject to the child’s reasonable 
preferences, sibling integrity, and practicalities, such as economic and physical 
constraints.130  The foremost rebuttal of the use of any allocation of custodial 
responsibility occurs whenever such an allocation would result in “substantial 
and almost certain harm to the child.”131 
Rather than dismiss the primary caretaker custody arrangement, it should be 
viewed as a step towards focusing on each parent’s “caretaking and other 
parenting functions”132 that contributed to the “child’s best interest.”133  It 
initiated a trend that would focus less on achieving fairness between the parents 
and more on prioritizing the best interest of the child.134  Because it was thought 
that a child would be better served by physical access to both parents, 
legislatures and courts became more favorably disposed towards joint physical 
custody arrangements. 
C.  Joint Physical Custody 
Due in part to the evolving cultural parameters of gender, economic 
opportunity, and personal liberty, interaction with both parents increasingly 
appeared to be in the child’s best interest.  Haltingly, to accommodate this, state 
legislatures and courts rejected the approach of a winning and a losing parent, 
focusing only on the attributes of each parent.  Instead, rival groups advocating 
for mothers and those advocating for fathers agreed each parent performing a 
reasonable share of parenting functions were equally qualified.  Absent domestic 
violence or similar conflicting issues, courts began to focus on “shared custodial 
responsibility and rights between parents, rather than legal neutrality as to which 
[] individual parent gained total custody.”135  Focus was on parents sharing 
childcare functions, not winning custody and allowing the other parent to visit. 
                                                 
 128. Id. § 2.08(1). 
 129. Id. § 2.08(1)(a); see, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 48-9-206 (LexisNexis 2001). 
 130. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§§ 2.08(1)(b)–(1)(f); § 2.08(4). 
 131. Id. § 2.08(1)(h); see, e.g., E.O.R. v. M.D.W., No. 17-0355, 2018 W.Va. LEXIS 160, at 
*10–12 (W. Va. 2018) (holding that allocation was warranted and appointing monitor to ensure 
safety of the child). 
 132. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 2.05(2)(c). 
 133. See id. § 2.02(1) (including meaningful contact with both parents, certainty, and 
predictable decision making). 
 134. Id. § 2.05(2). 
 135. Dinner, supra note 15, at 125. 
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By the 1980s, joint physical custody became more of an option.136  Was this 
to be a preference, a presumption, or was it to be reserved to those times when 
the parents requested it?  California became the first state to “incorporate a 
presumption that joint custody served the best interests of the child when both 
parents agreed to that arrangement.”137  Just as it had done with no-fault divorce 
and enforceable nonmarital contracts involving intimacy, California’s adoption 
of joint physical custody spearheaded greater discussion of the option across the 
nation.  “Within three years, every state had considered joint custody legislation, 
and thirty had enacted statutes recognizing this custody arrangement.  By 1989, 
of the thirty-three states that had enacted statutes recognizing joint custody, 
thirteen included ‘preferences’ or ‘rebuttable presumptions’ in favor of joint 
custody.”138  Individual state statutes varied, but “generally limited the 
presumption formally to instances of agreement between the parties, but also 
included friendly parent provisions that in effect broadened that 
presumption.”139 
In an effort to promote the values associated with joint physical custody, 
courts sought to craft joint custody arrangements, such as the following: One 
parent has physical custody from Monday at 5:30 p.m. until Wednesday at 5:30 
p.m.140  The other parent has parenting time from Wednesday at 5:30 p.m. until 
Friday at 5:30 p.m. each week.141  In addition, the parents shall alternate 
weekends, from Friday at 5:30 p.m. until Monday at 5:30 p.m.  The parent 
commencing the custody time is responsible for transportation throughout the 
custody period.142  And finally, the parents will share the child during holidays 
and summer vacations.143  Predictably, while meeting the goals encapsulated in 
joint physical custody, the arrangement soon falters if the parents do not 
communicate well or lack mutual respect.144 
Viewed academically joint physical custody makes a great deal of sense.  
Under normal circumstances a child thrives through equal access to both parents, 
and state and federal constitutions forbid utilizing gender in all but the most 
                                                 
 136. Joint physical custody is distinguished from joint legal custody in Blank v. Blank, 930 
N.W.2d 523, 536 (Neb. 2019) (holding that “‘[j]oint legal custody’ is the mutual authority and 
responsibility of the parents for making mutual fundamental decisions regarding the child’s 
welfare, including choices regarding education and health.” (citation omitted)). 
 137. Dinner, supra note 15, at 133 (citing to Law of Sept. 22, 1979, ch. 915, § 1, 1979 Cal. 
Stat. 3149, 3150 (amended 1983) (“There shall be a presumption, affecting the burden of proof, 
that joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child . . .”)). 
 138. Id. at 135 (citation omitted). 
 139. Id. 
 140. See In re Marriage of Luethje, No. 19-0768, 2020 Iowa App. Unpub. LEXIS 102, at *3 
(Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2020). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 11–12; see also In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 698, 700 (Iowa 2007) 
(holding that respect and communication issues prohibit use of joint physical custody). 
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compelling circumstances.  But at a practical level, even though women were 
employed in the workforce, and men were able to perform all household chores, 
the vast majority of families still adhered to traditional gender roles.  Mother 
remained primary caretakers of children and fathers remained the primary 
breadwinner.  Custody laws were ostensibly gender neutral, with an emphasis 
on shared parenting functions, but in reality, the gender roles were not gender 
neutral.  This gender disparity has an impact on child support. 
Men typically earn more from employment than women; mothers typically 
perform more childrearing functions than fathers.  Because a mother typically 
was less invested in a paid career, typically had fewer financial resources, and 
typically needed the child support payment to provide a home for her children, 
any reduction in support had dire consequences.  When divorce or physical 
separation occurs the lower earning mother often has to support her single parent 
household on her salary alone, usually with negligible or no decrease in the costs 
associated with the physical presence of children.  Divorce and the loss of a 
second income “deepened the economic insecurity of poor mothers and 
children.”145  Thus, while joint custody seemed fair and rationale, it in fact had 
adverse impact on financial support for a parent with fewer economic resources. 
Conceptually, the financial child support obligation is meant to equalize the 
child’s joint parenting residential situation.  When custody is awarded to the 
residential parent and visitation to the other, the nonresident parent pays the 
resident parent for the support of their child since the nonresident parent is not 
expected to maintain an intact household for the child.  But when there is a joint 
custody arrangement, each parent is expected to maintain two separate 
households to provide the child with equality of living arrangements.  But when 
there is joint custody, it seemingly negates child support from a nonresident to a 
resident parent since each parent is separately providing a home for the child.  
Ostensibly this seems fair, but in fact it is not if one of the parents has fewer 
financial resources than the other.  One commentator describes the resulting 
unfairness: 
By failing to account for the gendered division of labor within 
marriage, fathers’ rights activism devalued women’s caregiving labor, 
diminished mothers’ bargaining position at divorce, enabled men’s 
continuing control over ex-spouses, and deepened economic 
inequality between men and women at divorce.  Indeed, most elements 
of the [fathers’ rights] movement evolved in ensuing decades toward 
extreme antifeminist and misogynist positions, often arguing that 
women manipulated accusations of domestic violence and child abuse 
to advance their custody and property interests at divorce.146 
                                                 
 145. Dinner, supra note 15, at 139. 
 146. Id. at 146 (citing Kelly Allison Behre, Digging Beneath the Equality Language: The 
Influence of the Fathers’ Rights Movement on Intimate Partner Violence Public Policy Debates 
and Family Law Reform, 21 WM & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 525, 534–45 (2015)). 
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One parent’s post-divorce financial insecurity may occur in three separate 
ways.  First, the compulsory state child support guideline will mandate that both 
parents contribute to the financial support of their children.  This is the start of 
every child support calculation.  Guidelines seek to provide the child with “a 
minimum decent standard of living when the combined income of the parents is 
sufficient to achieve such result without impoverishing either parent.”147  The 
process expects the parent with more income to pay more support to the one with 
less, so as to provide the child with “a standard of living not grossly inferior to 
that of either parent.”148  But the guideline amounts may not be calculated to 
take this into account, and even if they do, they may be rebutted if the rebuttal 
would permit the “residential parents [to be] treated fairly.”149  That is, since 
joint custody makes both parents residential parents, rebuttal fairness would 
mean no support from one to the other. 
Initially, “fairly” means less support for the lower income parent because it is 
expected that his or her support duties are relatively equal to the other joint 
parent.  Ostensibly this seems justified and probably reasonable if the child 
spends relatively equal time with each parent.  But even if the child spends 
substantially equal time with each of the parents, this calculation does not take 
into consideration the fact that the lower income parent must provide a home for 
the child, often with fewer economic resources.  In reality, a child often “drifts” 
towards one parent from the other and the corresponding costs rise with the 
increasing presence of the child.  Throughout, the parent with fewer economic 
resources will not be able to provide a “minimum decent standard of living”150 
for the child similar to the other parent without financial support.  These facts 
are often overlooked in the guidelines. 
Second, parents who serve as primary caregivers during marriage often 
reduced their investment in a career as a consequence.  Therefore, these parents 
“suffered a competitive disadvantage when divorce forced them to reenter the 
labor market.”151  Because one parent, usually the mother, often sacrificed career 
development to stay at home and raise the children, that parent is less able to 
reenter the workforce and compete with the other parent who was able to develop 
a career while his or her children were being raised at home.  Income disparity 
between the adults is compensated for in the division of marital property and/or 
spousal support ordered by the court at divorce.152  Such apportionment is 
                                                 
 147. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 3.04(1)(a). 
 148. Id. § 3.04(1)(b). 
 149. Id. § 3.04(3). 
 150. Id. § 3.04(1)(a). 
 151. Dinner, supra note 15, at 142. 
 152. See, e.g., Rainwater v. Rainwater, 869 P.2d 176, 180–81 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (holding 
that after a long term marriage and child care responsibilities, wife was entitled to an award of 
rehabilitation and also financial support until death or remarriage to provide her with a standard of 
living comparable to marriage). 
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customary throughout the majority of states.153  But the child support guidelines 
do not expressly provide for career compensation adequate enough to rectify the 
disparity in reduced employment opportunities.  Hence, the resulting need to 
provide support to the parent who has made a sacrifice for the family to “provide 
all family members with a minimum decent standard of living.”154 
And third, the underlying premise of state statutory child support guidelines 
is misleading.155  Specifically, the child support guidelines “apply the ‘intact 
family’ child cost data to parental incomes and the number of children involved[] 
and then add other factors, such as health care insurance premiums and child 
care costs.”156  By using data applicable to one intact household as the premise 
upon which to calculate the guidelines the result is misleading.  There are in fact 
two distinct intact households when parents no longer cohabit.157  As a result, 
because there are two separate households, which must be separately 
maintained, the guidelines do not take into consideration the reality of child 
support.  “Accordingly, current guidelines should be adjusted for the additional 
cost of a second household to accurately reflect actual ability to pay[.]”158  The 
lack of a proper premise upon which to calculate child support is explained as 
follows: 
Parents in divorced or unwed situations live in separate households 
while intact families generally live in the same household.  Thus, a 
parent’s ability to pay is dramatically impacted if the parents are 
unwed or divorced because the parents are paying two mortgages/rent 
and two sets of household utilities. . . . Moreover, using economic data 
for an intact household creates a fictional standard of living that 
exceeds what is achievable by the parents for themselves.  Therefore, 
the view that a child is entitled to an intact family standard of living in 
a divorced or unwed situation is inappropriate and unreasonable.  It is 
more appropriate and reasonable to base child support on a realistic 
ability to pay that accurately reflects available income of parents living 
in two separate households.159 
                                                 
 153. See J. Thomas Oldham, An Overview of the Rules in the USA Regarding the Award of 
Post-Divorce Spousal Support in 2019, 41 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 525, 527 (2019). 
 154. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 3.04 cmt. (c)(i). 
 155. R. Mark Rogers & David A. Standridge, Child Support Cost Tables: The Case for Second 
Household Adjustment, 49 N. M. L. REV. 256 (2019). 
 156. Id. 
 157. The American Law Institute acknowledges this in its recitation of child support 
objectives.  “Normally, the preparation standard of living of all family members cannot be 
maintained at dissolution, for the cost of maintaining two household at a given standard of living 
is substantially greater than that of maintaining one.”  PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.04, cmt. (c). 
 158. Rogers & Standridge, supra note 156, at 257. 
 159. Id. at 258. 
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Not surprisingly, the federalization of child support through mandated 
guidelines and enforcement has focused states’ attention on meeting federal 
standards, often neglecting the reality of what is socially occurring.160  
Nonetheless, an amount established under the state guidelines is presumptively 
correct, only rebuttable if there is one or more factors that would make the 
amount established by the guidelines extraordinarily unjust.161  And while it may 
be possible to argue that joint physical custody and the establishment of two 
separate households is a sufficient rebutting factor, such a process is expensive, 
time consuming, and often beyond the understanding of the parties involved.  At 
a minimum, state child support guidelines must specifically accommodate the 
fact of joint physical custody—and the added financial consequences borne by 
a parent with financial disparity.162  But this is inadequate too.  Child support is 
important, and the inequities brought about because of the increased use of joint 
custody demand a process similar to what is provided to parents in formulating 
parenting plans.  Specifically, parents should be offered court-ordered services 
to prepare child support orders.163  When proposing parenting plans as a custody 
arrangement, the American Law Institute stipulated that parents must have 
access to information, mediation, and informed consent when developing a plan 
by which they would share child custody.  The parenting plan process 
recommended by the ALI is worthy of consideration when addressing disparity 
of child support. 
D.  Parenting Plans 
Each custody arrangement discussed previously incorporates what was then 
thought to be in the best interest of the child.  Hence, best interest is not a stand-
alone custody arrangement, rather it is the goal and substance of each and every 
child custody arrangement.  Sole custody in the father or mother, an award to a 
primary caretaker, or joint physical custody between two equal parents was each 
considered, at a point in time, to be in the best interest of the child.  This 
assimilation is illustrated in a Nebraska Supreme Court decision, holding that 
“Nebraska law neither favors nor disfavors any particular custody arrangement 
                                                 
 160. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–485, § 103(a)(3), 102 Stat. 2343 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2)) (illustrating the federal mandated rebuttable presumption in state child 
support guidelines). 
 161. Id. 
 162. See, e.g., State v. Jeffrey T., 932 N.W.2d 692, 713 (Neb. 2019) (citing to Neb. Ct. R. § 4-
212 (rev. 2011)): 
When a specific provision for joint physical custody is ordered and each party’s parenting 
time exceeds 142 days per year, it is a rebuttable presumption that support shall be 
calculated using worksheet 3.  When a specific provision for joint physical custody is 
ordered and one party’s parenting time is 109 to 142 days per year, the use of worksheet 
3 to calculate support is at the discretion of the court. . . . For purposes of these guidelines, 
a “day” shall be generally defined as including an overnight period. 
 163. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.07. 
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and instead requires all such determinations to be based on the best interests of 
the child.”164  Clearly the substance is best interest, the form is mutable. 
In addition to evolving custody arrangements, legislators and courts now seek 
to avoid a winning and a losing parent.  They avoid determination language that 
awards the child to one or the other parent as if the child were a prize awarded 
at the end of a conflict.  In times past, judges were “called upon to evaluate the 
child’s life chances in each of the homes competing for custody and then to 
predict with whom the child will be better off in the future.”165  Today, as is 
illustrated in an Iowa decision, there is a preference for “joint decisionmaking 
on routine matters” between both parents.166  This shift in attitude is true even 
when parents are contentious and having difficulty communicating.167 
As a result, parents are increasingly encouraged to develop workable 
“parenting plans” that focus on the child’s needs after parents cease 
cohabiting.168  The plans are expected to incorporate criteria for resolving future 
disputes between the parents, careful to use litigation as the last resort, and 
maximizing each parent’s continuing participation in the child’s life.169  To assist 
parents in formulating these plans, courts may provide parents with information, 
services to address conflicts such as domestic violence, and mediation services 
to assist in arriving at an agreement.170  Parenting plans have changed the way 
that custody is addressed in state courtrooms.  One commentator observes “the 
vocabulary of child custody law has changed to emphasize ‘shared parenting,’ 
‘decision-making,’ and ‘parenting plans’ in place of the more rigid and 
possessory terms, such as ‘custody’ and ‘visitation,’ which sound like refugees 
from criminal punishment.”171 
The American Law Institute (ALI) provides a comprehensive approach to 
using parenting plans, and its approach has been adopted by a majority of 
individual states.172  First beginning with the definition, the ALI defines a 
parenting plan as a set of provisions for allocation of custodial responsibility and 
decision-making responsibility on behalf of a child and for the resolution of 
                                                 
 164. Jeffrey T., 932 N.W.2d at 697. 
 165. Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Sanders, 381 A.2d 1154, 1163 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1977). 
 166. In re Marriage of Hynick, 727 N.W.2d 575, 580 (Iowa 2007). 
 167. See, e.g., Pace v. Pace, 595 S.W.3d 347, 352–53 (Ark. 2020). 
 168. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.05. 
 169. See id. § I2 II; see also id. § 2.10 (detailing a process for dispute resolution unless 
otherwise specified in parenting plan). 
 170. Id. § 2.07(1).  Costs associated with these services should be reasonable or at no cost at 
all.  Id. § 2.07(6). 
 171. J. Herbie DiFonzo, Dilemmas of Shared Parenting in the 21st Century: How Law and 
Culture Shape Child Custody, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1003, 1009 (2015). 
 172. For an example of a parenting plan see Sayre v. Furgeson, 66 N.E.3d 332, 335 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2016); see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.1705 (2006); see also Or. Rev. Stat. § 107.102 
(2017). 
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future disputes between the parents.173  The goal, as with other arrangements, is 
to maximize the child’s best interest by assisting parents to formulate a plan for 
the future.  Allocation of custodial responsibility is more than what was 
envisioned in the primary caretaker arrangement discussed above.174  Rather, the 
ALI proposal draws upon past conduct, but also anticipates  future conduct: 
including “(a) parental planning and agreement about the child’s custodial 
arrangements and upbringing; (b) continuity of existing parent-child 
attachments; (c) meaningful contact between the child and each parent; (d) 
caretaking relationships by adults who love the child, know how to provide for 
the child’s needs, and place a high priority on doing so; (e) security from 
exposure to conflict and violence; [and] (f) expeditious, predictable decision-
making and the avoidance of prolonged uncertainty respecting arrangements for 
the child’s care and control.”175 
The process contemplated by the ALI begins whenever parents cease to 
cohabit, usually occasioned by a petition for divorce or legal separation.  Of 
course nonmarital cohabitants are parents and may formulate parenting plans 
too.176  The parent or parents seeking child custody must then, in states requiring 
them, file with the court a parenting plan, accompanied by an affidavit 
describing, among other items, past parenting responsibilities for the child, 
employment obligations, child care possibilities, and any expected changes to 
these items in the future.177  Importantly, if there are allegations or reports of 
parental conflict, domestic violence, or child abuse, these issues should be made 
known.178  If there is credible evidence that conflict or abuse exists in the 
household then mediation to arrive at a plan should not occur unless both parents 
agree to participate in a meaningful way.179 
What separates formulation of a parenting plan from computation of child 
support is that with the latter, there are no direct court-ordered services that assist 
                                                 
 173. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 2.03 cmt. d. 
 174. See supra Section II.B. 
 175. PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
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§ 2.07. 
 178. Id. § 2.05(2)–(3) ; see also §§ 2.06(2), 2.07(1)(c), 2.07(2)–(3) (permitting the court to hold 
an evidentiary hearing to determine if child abuse or domestic violence has occurred).  “Currently, 
all fifty states and the District of Columbia require courts making a custody determination to 
consider domestic violence by one parent against another.”  J. Herbie DiFonzo, From the Rule of 
One to Shared Parenting: Custody Presumptions in Law in Policy, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 224 
(2014). 
 179. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 2.07(2). 
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parents to understand and formulate a comprehensive child support order.  The 
state is more heavily invested in a child custody arrangement, so it assists parents 
in developing an adequate parenting plan.  Once the plan is formulated and filed 
with the court, it may serve as a temporary or a final plan180 based on what 
appears to be in the child’s best interest.181  And, throughout its viability, the 
plan may be enforced through provisions in the plan itself, civil remedies, or 
criminal prosecution.182 
At a minimum any acceptable parenting plan submitted to the court for 
approval should include the following: (1) a description of the child’s living 
arrangements at each parent’s home, and (2) the schedule/formula of when that 
child will reside at each home.  This is referred to as the custodial schedule.  The 
parenting plan must also include  a process by which significant child care 
decisions may be made, and  a plan for resolving disputes that may arise and 
recourse for violations of the plan’s terms.183  The process for future 
modification of any plan approved by the court may be specified in the plan 
too.184  Interestingly, parenting plans are meant to be inclusive of all types of 
families, any number of living arrangements, multiple custodial persons, and 
scheduling designed by the parents themselves.  There are some limitations.  
Those persons defined as parents enjoy Constitutional Due Process protections 
that empower them to withdraw visitation or custody arrangements from 
nonparents.185 
Once the parenting plan is properly submitted the court is bound to give the 
agreement “deference” unless the agreement “(a)is not knowing or voluntary, or  
(b) would be harmful to the child.”186  And while allegations of domestic 
violence or child abuse are easily alleged and serious, it is the parents’ 
unwillingness to cooperate in drafting another mediation-assisted agreement that 
                                                 
 180. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Wilson, 68 P.3d 1121, 1127 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (holding 
that a parenting plan becomes a permanent one whenever the court so specifies). 
 181. See Bessette v. Bessette, 434 P.3d 894, 270–71 (Mont. 2019) (distinguishing among 
stipulated, temporary and final parenting plans); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.05(4) (providing for temporary allocation 
of parenting). 
 182. See id. § 2.19. 
 183. Id. § 2.05(5).  Mediation is one method of resolving disputes.  See id. § 2.07. 
 184. Id. §§ 2.05(6), 2.15–2.16 (granting courts power to modify upon material change in 
circumstances or if the plan is not working as contemplated); see, e.g., Sinram v. Berube, 432 P.3d 
709, 712–13 (Mont. 2019) (utilizing provision in plan permitting modification thereby avoiding a 
petition for court-ordered modification); Todd M.S. v. Julie M.G., 741 S.E.2d 837, 843–44 (W. Va. 
2013) (holding that modification based on terms of the parenting plan does not require substantial 
change of circumstances). 
 185. PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
2.03 cmt. a–b (defining legal parents, parents by estoppel, and de facto parents). 
 186. Id. § 2.06(1); see also § 2.111 (listing factors that rebut the approval of a parenting plan); 
see, e.g., Thorton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781 (Minn. 2019) (domestic abuse rebuts any deference 
for the parental agreement); Araya v. Keleta, 65 A.3d 40, 44 (D.C. 2013) (an “intrafamily offense” 
is a rebuttable factor). 
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will rebut the deference attaching to the parenting plan.187  Overall, public policy 
concludes that a properly executed parenting plan “is more likely to succeed than 
one that has been ordered by the court over the objection of one or both 
parents.”188  Thus, the goal is to provide the parents with services that will 
produce a constructive plan of custody.  A similar commitment for child support 
is warranted. 
But what if parents cannot work together to formulate an effective parenting 
plan?  Stated another way, what if the presumption in favor of a parenting plan 
is rebutted by the inescapable fact that the parents cannot cooperate, or that the 
presence of violence or abuse cannot be mitigated?  The ALI then offers an 
alternative.  A court may “allocate custodial responsibility so that the proportion 
of custodial time the child spends with each parent approximates the proportion 
of time each parent spent performing caretaking functions for the child prior to 
the parents’ separation.”189  Even though a court is imposing a custody 
arrangement upon the parents, the objectives it utilizes are similar to those meant 
to be incorporated into a parenting plan drafted by the child’s parents.  Also, by 
mimicking the past custodial responsibilities a court is utilizing what the parents 
have done in the past, thereby involving the parents more directly in any custody 
arrangement.  And finally, “reliance on past caretaking . . . [corresponds] 
reasonably well to the parties’ actual expectations” not clouded by anger, loss 
and anxiety often associated with divorce.190 
Allocation of custodial responsibility by a court rather than through a 
parenting plan still seeks the following objectives in uniformity throughout the 
state: (1) to permit the child a reasonable relationship with each parent; (2) to 
accommodate a child’s preferences if the child is of a reasonable age; (3) to keep 
siblings together if it appears this would further the welfare of a child; (4) to 
accommodate a child’s individual welfare and one parent’s unique ability to 
meet the child’s needs; (5) to accommodate any established parenting 
arrangement if it is reasonable and serves the child’s interests; and (6) to 
emphasize the practical circumstances that involve the child’s stability, 
including scheduling, transportation, costs, and parental cooperation.191  And, as 
with any child custody order, should there be a material change of 
circumstances, such as a relocation of a custodial parent or a danger of harm to 
a child, the custody allocation may be modified.192  If there is insufficient 
                                                 
 187. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 2.06(3). 
 188. Id. § 2.06 cmt. a. 
 189. Id. § 2.08(1). 
 190. Id. § 2.08 cmt. b. 
 191. Id. § 2.08(1)(a)–(f).  Courts often find sibling integrity in the best interest of a child.  See, 
e.g., In re Marriage of Will, 489 N.W.2d 394, 398 (Iowa 1992). 
 192. PRINCIPLES OF THE L. OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 
2.08(1)(g)–(h) (specifying relocation in accordance with § 2.17(4) and accommodating “substantial 
and almost certain harm to the child”). 
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evidence to establish a pattern of past custodial responsibility, then the court 
should make an award based on the child’s best interest and the practical 
circumstances involved.193 
The American Law Institute distinguishes a child’s physical custody from his 
or her legal custody, which is a common distinction among the states.  The ALI 
refers to legal custody as significant decision-making responsibilityand this 
includes the “mutual authority and responsibility . . . for making mutual 
fundamental decisions regarding the child’s welfare, including choices 
regarding education and health.”194  Although different from physical custody, 
when awarding legal custody the ALI first looks to any agreement between the 
parties.  Indeed, even if there is no express agreement, if there has developed a 
pattern of decision-making responsibility then presumptively this pattern is to 
be adopted unless contrary to the best interest of the child.195 
If there is no mutual agreement, or no existing pattern of decision making, 
then decision making responsibility is allocated by the court based on what is in 
the best interest of the child.196  And throughout physical and legal custody the 
American Law Institute promotes each parent’s involvement with the child.  
This is illustrated by permitting a parent without joint decision making authority 
nonetheless to possess “sole responsibility for day-to-day decisions” whenever 
the child is in that parent’s physical control.197  That parent also has access to 
school and health care records unless such access would not be in the best 
interest of the child.198 
Enforcement of the parenting plan begins with a complaint from a parent 
alleging that another parent “intentionally and without good cause violated a 
provision.”199  The court will then enforce the plan by first looking to whether 
there is an enforcement mechanism built into the plan.  If not, the court will 
apply other remedies, such as make-up visitation time, reasonable expenses 
associated with the infraction, order that the offending parent undergo 
counseling, or modify the plan.200  Enforcement through civil contempt is also a 
remedy.201  But enforcement mechanisms do not include permitting parents to 
commit offenses in retaliation for the other parent’s violation.  And finally, 
                                                 
 193. Id. § 2.08(3)–(4). 
 194. Blank v. Blank, 930 N.W.2d 523, 536 (Neb. 2019) (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-2922(11) 
(2016)). 
 195. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 2.09(2). 
 196. Id. § 2.09(1).  State courts will look to the allocation of physical custody, the level of each 
parent’s decision making in the past, the wishes of the parent, level of cooperation between the 
parents in the past, and the existences of limiting factors such as abuse, violence, neglect, or parental 
alienation.  See id. § 2.11(1). 
 197. Id. § 2.09(3). 
 198. Id. § 2.09(4). 
 199. Id. § 2.19(1). 
 200. Id. § 2.19(1)(a)–(f). 
 201. See, e.g., In re Custody of Halls, 109 P.3d 15, 18 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
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parents may depart from the terms of the plan if they mutually agree and the 
departures is consistent with the terms of their plan agreement.202 
Many states utilize ALI parenting plans when addressing child custody, either 
expressly or implicitly, by requiring, as a condition for joint custody, that the 
parents communicated with each other and demonstrate respect.203  But because 
joint custody is involved in either arrangement there is the possibility that the 
parent with fewer financial resources may suffer unjustly.  To illustrate, a 
Minnesota court awarded joint physical custody of the children to the parents 
upon their divorce.204  The mother received 57% of parenting time and the father 
received 43%, well within the parameters of what would constitute joint physical 
custody205.  Then, because the parents purportedly had relatively equal amount 
of time with the children, they agreed to deviate from the state sanctioned child 
support guidelines and instead to use an expense-sharing formula.206  This 
agreement resulted in no child support being paid to the parent with the lesser 
income even though the proportion of that parent’s income would be adversely 
affected by the significant physical presence of the child.207  But for the parent 
with greater income, the income proportion needed to care for the child would 
be less, plus there is no payment of child support to the other parent.  Obviously, 
a joint custody plan can be advantageous to this parent, the parent with greater 
financial resources. 
There is a financial incentive for the higher income parent to petition for joint 
physical custody because, if granted, it will likely result in reduced or no child 
support payments.  And even if joint custody is not granted, the threat of it may 
incentivize the lower income parent to surrender child support, spousal support 
or division of marital property so as to retain as much physical custody of the 
child as possible.  As one commentator writes, “the parent more invested in 
custody will often trade away marital property, spousal support, or child support 
for a greater share of custody.  Some claim that the less-invested parent may 
threaten to initiate custody litigation to pressure the other parent to make such 
tradeoffs.”208 
                                                 
 202. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 2.19(2)–(3). 
 203. See, e.g.,, Klimek v. Klimek, 775 N.W.2d 444, 450 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that 
“communication is an essential requirement for joint custody to be successful”). 
 204. Pudlick v. Pudlick, No. A18-1652, 2019 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1031, at *1–2 (Ct. 
App. Nov. 4, 2019). 
 205. Id. at *2. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See id. at *1–2, *9–10. 
 208. Abramowicz & Abramowicz, supra note 56, at 391–92 (citations omitted); see also 
Elizabeth S. Scott, supra note 122, 651–52; Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: 
Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 168, 178–79 (1984) 
(denigrating trading custody for money); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in 
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950, 963–65 (1979) (discussing the 
disadvantages encountered by a parent seeking more custody of a child). 
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Child support is impacted by joint physical custody, often to the detriment of 
a parent with fewer economic resources yet willing to trade financial support or 
marital property for maximum amounts of child custody.  Yet while courts often 
provide extensive services to couples drafting parenting plans, such services are 
absent when couples negotiate child support arrangements.  These arrangements, 
left to attorneys to negotiate the states’ mathematical guidelines, are suffused 
with allegations of domestic violence, parental alienation, and fictitious schemes 
of joint parenting times.  Child support determinations deserve the same court-
ordered services as are offered for child custody.  But first we need to review 
how child support is calculated.  
III.  CHILD SUPPORT 
A.  Purposes 
If the best interest of the child is the focus of child custody, then it follows 
that the goal of child support should be to enhance any custody arrangement.  
And yet, the calculation of child support has not kept pace with the evolution of 
child custody.  Joint physical custody is often overlooked in guideline 
formulations or accommodated in a facile manner.  For example, Nebraska child 
support guidelines specify “that when [] visitation or parenting time periods of 
28 days or more in any 90-day period, support payments may be reduced by up 
to 80 percent . . . using the trial court’s discretion.”209  Thus, if a child support 
paying parent has physical custody of his or her child for the entire summer, 
three months, that parent’s child support payment should be supplemented by 
fifty percent to accommodate for the added costs associated with the physically 
present child.210  And yet, this supplement is not certain, it is discretionary as a 
rebuttable factor, contrasted with the knowledge that the other parent must still 
maintain the child’s other home for that child’s eventual return.211 
The fault lies in the computation of a state’s statutory guideline, which is 
static, and not always rectified by rebuttable factors.212  The guideline is 
mandatory as the starting point and a court must find, and reduce to writing, its 
rebutting determination that the percentage of time each parent will have 
physical custody will not accurately reflect the ratio of funds each parent will 
                                                 
 209. Lucero v. Lucero, 750 N.W.2d 377, 383–85 (Neb. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that trial courts 
must use specific guideline worksheets accommodating different custody periods). 
 210. Id. at 389. 
 211. See, e.g., Frost v. Monahan, No. A-18-1081, 2020 Neb. App. LEXIS 107, at *23–24 (Ct. 
App. Apr. 7, 2020) (holding that physical custody of the child did not warrant an abatement of child 
support). 
 212. See, e.g., Serrano v. Serrano, No. 2018-CA-001888-ME, 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
178, at *10–11 (Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2020) (noting that state legislation has not provided for a 
statutory support calculation for joint custody). 
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directly spend on supporting the child.213  Thus, the child support guideline is 
the rebuttable support amount each parent must pay.  Any rebuttal must be 
supported with written findings as to why the application of the guideline 
amount would be unjust or improper.214  This of course generates bargaining 
between the parties, but this bargaining is not comparable to that which goes into 
drafting a parenting plan.215  State-ordered services offered to the parents are not 
mandated and often parents—and their attorneys—are perplexed by the 
mathematical basis of the guidelines.  The state’s child support guidelines should 
serve as a baseline upon which the couple may build a workable support 
framework that focuses on the best interest of the child, similar to child custody.  
This is not a novel suggestion: “We see the primary function of contemporary 
divorce law not as imposing order from above, but rather as providing a 
framework within which divorcing couples can themselves determine their post 
dissolution rights and responsibilities.”216 
An illustration of guidelines deficiency, the inefficiency of rebutting the 
guideline amount, and the unfairness that results occurred in a decision from the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals.217  The facts include a couple married for seven 
years and two children were born during this time.218  When they separated, the 
parents formulated a joint custody arrangement that coordinated work schedules 
and minimized the need for formal daycare.219  Under the state’s guideline 
calculation the father was obligated to pay $722 in child support because he 
earned more than the mother, but without a written finding, the court reduced 
this to $67 a month.220  It appears that the trial court deviated—rebutted—the 
state guideline amount because the couple had agreed to a joint custody 
arrangement and the guideline did not incorporate an allowance for joint 
custody. 
The state trial court’s deviation was understandable but its rebuttal and failure 
to issue written findings prompted the other to appeal its ruling and thus claim 
the higher amount of $722 monthly.  The state’s appellate court identified the 
issue as a legislative failure to incorporate joint custody into the state’s child 
                                                 
 213. See Vogus v. Vogus, 460 P.3d 1220, 1223–24, 1223 n.11 (Alaska 2020) (citing Alaska R. 
Civ. Proc. 90.3(b)). 
 214. See Griggs v. Griggs, 304 So. 741, 746 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020) (citing Rule 32(A), Ala. R. 
Jud. Admin.). 
 215. See Brinig, supra note 16, at 811–12 (suggesting that “bargaining occurs despite the 
apparent rigidity and statewide applicability of child support guidelines”). 
 216. Mnookin & Kornhouser, supra note 208, at 950. 
 217. Serrano v. Serrano, No. 2018-CA-001888-ME, 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 178, at 
*26–28 (Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2020). 
 218. Id. at *1. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at *27; see also Carver v. Carver, 488 S.W.3d 585, 593 (Ky. 2016) (noting a court 
must file a specific finding for deviation from the guideline amount); see also Fam. Support Act of 
1988, 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (2018) (requiring a written or specific finding to rebut the guidelines 
presumption). 
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support guidelines.221  Since 2018, Kentucky joined with other states in finding 
that joint custody is in the best interest of the child,222 but “[t]o whatever degree 
the legislature has kept pace with society when it comes to custody itself, it lags 
much further behind when it comes to the child support statutes.”223  Indeed, 
“the legislature has yet to devise a statutory support calculation for what has 
become a far more common custody arrangement—joint custody and equal 
parenting time.”224  The appellate court also stated, “[m]aking either joint 
custodian with equal parenting time pay his or her support obligation to the other 
is obviously unjust and, frankly, antithetical to the custody award.”225  Thus, to 
achieve fairness, “the judiciary is left to decide [child] support by creatively 
applying existing statutes and the existing sole custody worksheet to 
circumstances for which they are not designed.”226 
The judiciary may rebut the guideline financial award with a finding that the 
amount is extraordinarily unjust or inappropriate.  Kentucky confines the 
meaning of this phrase to seven criteria enumerated in statute,227 but meeting the 
extraordinary level is difficult.  For example, the Kentucky appellate court in 
Serrano held that an award of joint custody with equal parenting time is not a 
sufficient extraordinary factor so as to effectively rebut the presumption 
provided by the guideline.228  This merits a brief discussion of the guidelines. 
B.  Function 
The establishment and enforcement of child support obligations through state 
and federal statutes is recent but unyielding.  Courts have “repeatedly 
recognized, one of the most fundamental duties of parenthood is ‘the obligation 
of the parent to support the child until the law determines that he is able to care 
for himself.’”229  And yet the level of that parental support was vague, 
encompassing necessities at first and then focusing on the child’s needs and the 
parent’s ability to pay.  In our discussion of the evolution of custody 
arrangements in the beginning there was one residential parent and one 
                                                 
 221. Serrano v. Serrano, No. 2018-CA-001888-ME, 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 178, at *3 
(Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2020). 
 222. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(2) (West 2018). 
 223. Serrano, 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 178, at *13. 
 224. Id. at 17.  The court suggested that courts begin to use another form of guideline, one 
which will allow for joint custody and two separate households.  Id. at 33, 36–37.  See id. at 33–37 
(identifying the Colorado Method of calculating child support as one such method and 
recommending the lower court use it). 
 225. Id. at 26–27. 
 226. Id. at 18; see also Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759, 765 (Ky. 2008) (holding that 
standardization is difficult when statutes do not address all of the possible permeations). 
 227. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.211(3)–(4) (West 2018). 
 228. Serrano, 2020 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 178, at *31–32.  But holding that the trial court 
may find that the cost of providing two homes is extraordinary.  Id. 
 229. Monmouth Cty. Div. of Soc. Servs. for D.M. v. G.D.M., 705 A.2d 408, 410 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1997) (quoting Wills v. Jones, 667 A.2d 331, 332 (Md. 1995). 
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nonresidential parent, the nonresidential parent was expected to pay for 
whatever the residential parent needed to provide for the child’s needs.  Even 
then, child support awards were spotty, variable, and lacked interstate 
enforceability.  “Research at the state level . . . documented considerable 
variation in award values, even among families of similar size and 
socioeconomic characteristics.”230  Inconsistency in awards fostered both lack 
of payment and lack of enforcement. 
Nonetheless, child support became increasingly important after California 
became the first state to permit no-fault divorce in 1969.  Previously divorce 
could only be brought by an innocent spouse who could show a provable fault 
by the other spouse, such as adultery, desertion, or cruelty.  After 1969, divorce 
could be obtained by either spouse, innocent or guilty, simply by showing the 
couple experienced irreconcilable differences, which led to the irremediable 
breakdown of the marriage.231  Other states quickly joined California and 
enacted similar no-fault statutes and divorce rates soared,232 which accelerated 
the child support determinations.  By 1970, the National Conference of 
Commissioners of Uniform State Laws voted to make “irretrievable breakdown” 
the sole ground for divorce, which was defined as parties living separate and 
apart for more than 180 days.233 
In 1973, the National Conference enacted codified provisions for awarding 
child support in its Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, one of the first efforts 
to codify family law standards.  The Act provided highly discretionary factors 
for a court to consider when ordering a parent, without regard to marital fault, to 
pay an amount “reasonable or necessary” for a child’s support.234  The court was 
to consider the following factors: 
(1) the financial resources of the child; (2) the financial resources of 
the custodial parent; (3) the standard of living the child would have 
enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved; (4) the physical and 
emotional condition of the child and his educational needs; and (5) the 
financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent.235 
Interpretations of these factors were subjective, and results lacked 
consistency. 
Gradually there developed an increasing number of children in single-parent 
households that were defined by state standards as below the poverty line.  
Concomitantly, these identified children were more likely to experience poor 
health issues, behavioral problems, higher school dropout rates, incarceration, 
                                                 
 230. Marsha Garrison, Autonomy of Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental 
Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 41, 43 (1998). 
 231. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2310(a) (2015). 
 232. See Raymond C. O’Brien, The Reawakening of Marriage, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 339, 354 
(1999) (noting divorce rate doubled between 1960 and 1990). 
 233. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 302 cmt. (a)(2) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1973). 
 234. Id. § 309. 
 235. Id. 
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and early childbearing and divorce rates.  While not confined to poor homes, 
there were multiple instances of child abuse, neglect, abandonment, and 
surrender, resulting in foster care placements for children.  Foster care placement 
was expensive and by 1980 “more than 500,000 children resided in foster care 
while child-protective agencies worked with families by providing services and 
an open time frame for modification of adverse behavior.”236 
Ultimately, the Federal government paid for foster care but to curb 
expenditures Congress enacted a series of legislation that, in effect, federalized 
child support in each of the states.  First, Congress passed the Adoption 
Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA) in 1980, which mandated that 
states meet definitive standards or otherwise federal foster care payments would 
cease.237  Among these specified standards are: (1) a written case plan for each 
child; (2) a description of where the child is placed and the reasonable services 
offered to the parents to facilitate family reunification; (3) as an alternative, 
services provided to establish another permanent placement for the child; (4) an 
administrative review of the child’s placement at least every six months; and (5) 
a judicial review no later than eighteen months after the initial placement and 
periodically thereafter.238  States were forced to comply with the federal 
mandates and as a result “within five years of its passage, the AACWA reduced 
the number of children in foster care to 270,000.”239  Yet, numbers of children 
in foster care began to rise again.240 
Following its 1980 legislation, Congress enacted a statute in 1997 that focused 
less on reasonable services offered to parents and more on finding reasonable 
placements for children as quickly as possible.241  The focus shifted from parents 
to children.  Freeing children from interminable foster care benefitted federal 
coffers, but it was a significant shift in policy.242  The Adoption and Safe 
Families Act (ASFA)243 was enacted in 1997 and had as its stated goal to 
“achieve permanency for children at an accelerated pace.”244  Specifically, the 
                                                 
 236. Raymond C. O’Brien, Reasonable Efforts and Parent-Child Reunification, 2013 MICH. 
STATE L. REV. 1029, 1042 (2013). 
 237. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, § 471 (b), 94 
Stat. 500 (1980).  But see generally Ann Cammett, Deadbeat Dads & Welfare Queens: How 
Metaphor Shapes Poverty Law, 34 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 233 (2014) (discussing child support 
and its interaction with child welfare); Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 229 (2000). 
 238. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 § 475(5)(B)–(C). 
 239. O’Brien, Reasonable Efforts and Parent-Child Reunification, supra note 236, at 1042. 
 240. Id. at 1042–43. 
 241. Id. at 1043. 
 242. See generally Kathleen S. Bean, Aggravated Circumstances, Reasonable Efforts, and 
ASFA, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 223 (2009) (noting the significant change in policy as focus 
shifted from the parents to the children). 
 243. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105–89, § 1(a), 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) 
[hereinafter ASFA]; 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B)(ii) (2012). 
 244. O’Brien, Reasonable Efforts and Parent-Child Reunification, supra note 236, at 1043. 
266 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 70.2:1 
1997 legislation requires the state to petition a court for termination of parental 
rights if a child resides in foster care for more than fifteen of the last twenty-two 
months.245 
A year earlier, Congress replaced the open-ended welfare benefits provided 
by Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with time-limited benefits 
coupled with strict work requirements.  This legislation was titled the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  It was part of broader legislation titled 
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA).246  The legislation had a profound impact on state child support 
because it offers federal grants to the states but requires states to comply with 
federal mandates in return.247  Specifically, PRWORA requires that states submit 
plans on how each will implement family assistance programs, including a plan 
on how the state will require a parent to engage in employment as soon as 
possible, but no later than twenty-four months.248  In addition, the state must 
certify that it will implement a child support enforcement program,249 which 
includes federal and state measures: a Federal Parent Locator Service.  States 
are required to have a State Directory of New Hires; a separate organization to 
“provide services relating to the establishment of paternity or the establishment, 
modification, or enforcement of child support obligations;” a state disbursement 
unit to collect and disburse support payments; and a statewide information 
system, including a case registry system to track the collection of child 
support and a system to “facilitate the collection and disbursement of support 
payments.”250 
In 1984, Congress required states to adopt nonbinding formulaic child support 
guidelines.  Then, in 1988, federal legislation required that these guidelines be 
given presumptive effect and any rebuttal requires a written justification.251  The 
American Law Institute comments that “the factors that underlay inadequate or 
unjust discretionary child-support awards could not be expected to vanish in the 
face of formulaic guidelines; those factors might instead be expected to 
influence rulemakers who construct the guidelines.”252  Developments such as 
joint custody are expected to be addressed by those responsible for formulating 
the guidelines themselves. 
Each state is able to formulate a child support guideline that seems most 
appropriate to any set of circumstances as long as it take into consideration 
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 246. H.R. Rep. No. 104-651 (1997), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183. 
 247. See, e.g., Hodges v. Thompson, 311 F.3d 316, 320 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that if a state 
fails to comply with federal requirements it must pay a penalty). 
 248. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
 249. See id. § 602(a)(2). 
 250. See id. §§ 653(a)(1), 653a(a)(1)(A), 654(4)(A), 654a(b), 654a(e)(4)(A)–(B), 654a(g)(1). 
 251. See id. § 667(b)(2). 
 252. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ I4. 
2021] Child Support and Joint Physical Custody 267 
certain minimal requirements and a process of review at least every four years.253  
States have enacted three different types of guidelines: (1) Melson Formula, (2) 
Percentage of Income, and (3) Income Shares Model.254  A majority of states use 
the income shares model, in part because it begins with the premise that a child 
should be provided with support from both parents as if the parents had never 
separated.255 
Once a state adopts a guideline formula it then must determine income, gross 
and net, future modification parameters, plus at what point should support 
end.256  And, of course, what constitutes sufficient grounds for rebuttal of the 
guideline amount.257  There are those who criticize using intact family spending 
data to create a guideline amount when in fact two separate households exist.258  
But any guideline is presumptive and maybe rebutted by such factors 
incorporated into the guideline such as joint custody, medical necessities, and 
childcare, or insurance.  Otherwise, objections to the guidelines may occur 
through rebuttal, but even here there are limits.  Rebuttal must be based on 
written findings making the award unjust, such as added expenses such as 
childcare.259 
Ordering child support should not be equated with receipt of child support.  
Consistently, less than half of parents obligated to receive child support actually 
receive the full amount due, and the other half receive partial payment or nothing 
at all.260  Nonetheless, federal efforts to collect unpaid child support have 
aggressively expanded since the Child Support and Establishment of Paternity 
amendments of 1974 and 1975, whereby states were directed to locate parents 
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and establish paternity.261  For example, in 1988 Congress enacted the Family 
Support Act,262 which required wage withholding, automatic tracking and 
monitoring systems, and the Act also created a special Commission on Interstate 
Child Support Enforcement.  Then, in 1990, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act required the Internal Revenue Service to collect child support arrearages of 
$500 or more when required by the state.263 
Once federal enforcement of child support collection showed progress, 
additional legislation followed.  In 1992, the Child Support Recovery Act made 
it a federal crime to withhold interstate child support,264 and in 1994, the Full 
Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act required each state to enforce the 
child support orders of other states and prohibited modification of them without 
proper jurisdiction.265  By 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA),266 which required each 
state to enact the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act,267 codifying 
procedures for establishing jurisdiction for initiating or modifying any support 
order.  Overall, federal enforcement included refusal to issue a passport,268 
permitting states to employ civil incarceration for refusal to pay child support,269 
and enactment of the Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998.270 
Undoubtedly the federalization of child support has forced states to develop 
consistent state-wide support orders, it has forced states to better identify parents 
and collect child support from each, and in this mobile society it has made 
collection available across state lines.  There is some federal involvement in 
child custody, but federal involvement is not nearly as prevalent as with child 
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support.271  But federal involvement comes at a cost, which is more than simply 
the loss of state autonomy.  Arguably, that states have focused for decades on 
how best to comply with federal mandates so as to maximize federal 
entitlements.  The dilemma this poses is that often states have not focused on the 
practical realities of child support, issues such as developing effective guidelines 
that accommodate joint physical custody.272  But most of all, states have failed 
to provide the type of court-ordered services that accompany child custody 
orders.  This failure results in unfairness, litigation, and worst of all, it runs 
counter to the best interest of the child. 
C.  Observations 
Child support is firmly established as a federal-state effort, prompting a 
number of observations concerning the purpose of child support and the manner 
in which it is formulated and enforced at the state and federal levels.273 
First, child support is a parental responsibility without regard to gender, 
marital status, or economic background.  One court summarized the rationality 
of imposing consequences for nonpayment as punishing a parent for failing “to 
live up to a most basic civic and even moral responsibility: the provision of 
support to . . . children.”274   
Second, because of the increasing federalization of child support any 
determination of support must begin with the state statutory guidelines.  They 
are presumptively correct and any rebuttal of the amounts produced warrants 
written findings of extraordinary circumstances.275  States utilize one of three 
primary guideline formulations and each is designed to provide a presumptive 
amount of support that can then be rebutted, supplemented, or modified in 
accordance with state procedures.  And while premarital and marital agreement 
between adults may determine the parameters of adult duties, such an agreement 
may not adversely affect the rights of a child or alter the presumptive authority 
of state support guidelines.276  Agreements may be advantageous in enforcing, 
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for example, private agreements that enhance support obligations, such as 
paying for college or graduate school.277 
Third, while today’s child custody determinations most often begin with adult 
parents aided in arriving at a custody agreement—parenting plan—that 
maximizes their involvement and future enforcement, the same is not true with 
child support.  “Balancing has not previously been systematically applied in the 
development of child-support rules and formulas.”278  Yet, the American Law 
Institute proposes a child support structure by which the parties may work 
toward compromise utilizing concrete objectives.279  These objectives include: 
first, each parent’s income should be shared to provide the child with a minimum 
standard of living whereby one parent’s standard of living is not grossly inferior 
to that of the other;280 second, that the child fairly share in important life 
opportunities without causing either parent to be treated unfairly;281 and third, 
that the support obligation be comprehensible, readily enforceable and 
modifiable, and minimize conflict between the parents.282 
Fourth, too often we are locked in language that has become outdated by the 
movement towards adoption of joint physical custody.  For example, the ALI 
child support objectives are based in a formulaic support guideline.  The ALI 
adopts one derived from that used in Massachusetts.283  The formula balances 
“the precise extent to which the higher-income parent enjoys a higher standard 
of living that the other parent . . . [based on] the relative strength of competing 
interests.”284  Yet throughout its comments on the child support guideline, the 
ALI is locked in language that addresses residential parent versus nonresidential 
parent, obligor and obligee.  For example: “The base is an estimate of the 
percentage of obligor income that will ensure all parties the same standard of 
living when the residential parent otherwise has income equal to that of the 
obligor parent.”285  When addressing joint custody parents (dual resident 
parents),286 the American Law Institute retains the child support formula 
guideline but admits that child expenditures are greater now that there are two 
households.  It also cautions that the child support award should minimize any 
distinction in the child’s standard of living in either of the two different 
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households.287  And then the ALI offers as a proper modification of the stated 
formula a support award based on the degree of “each parent’s percentage of 
residential responsibility.”288  Such a process is litigious, lengthy, and 
unnecessary.  It would be better that the guideline be a part of a mediated process 
initiated by the court, which addresses from the start all unique features of child 
custody and child support.  One impacts the other and both benefit from a 
process similar to that which produces a good parenting plan. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Child custody and child support share a common goal, the best interest of the 
child.  But child custody determinations have benefitted from progressive 
understanding of the fundamental rights of each parent, the avoidance of 
stereotypes such as gender or sexual orientation, and the emergence of 
parenthood through assisted reproductive technology.  Partially as a result of this 
understanding, child custody has increasingly drifted towards a joint 
arrangement crafted by parents with the assistance of court-ordered services.  
This joint arrangement is called a parenting plan by the American Law Institute.  
Most importantly, this plan is drafted with the professional assistance, persons 
familiar with the issues and able to offer constructive proposals outside the 
litigious atmosphere of court hearings. 
Child support awards would benefit from similar professional assistance, not 
in a rebuttal of child support guidelines, but rather working with the guidelines 
to accommodate the issues that do and may arise.  Arguably, the federalization 
of child support has dulled state efforts to better respond to the challenges posed 
by joint physical custody arrangements.  Federalization is a given, as are the 
guidelines which it mandates.  But what may be done now is to provide a better 
process by which to establish a fair and just child support order.  This process 
would be similar to that used to draft a child custody parenting plan. 
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